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I. Introduction
In Penry v. Lynaugh,' the United States Supreme Court held that the
Texas death penalty statute was applied unconstitutionally because the trial
court gave no instructions allowing the jury to "consider and give effect to"
the defendant's mitigating evidence2 of organic brain damage, moderate
retardation, and disadvantaged background.3 The Court considered these
mitigating factors relevant because of society's steadfast belief in the lesser
culpability of defendants whose criminal acts are due to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental disorders.! The jury must have
1. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
2. Id. at 327-28.
3. Id. at 307-10. Penry has two main parts. In the first part, the Court addresses the
mitigating evidence issues discussed in this Article. Id. at 313-28. In the second part, the
Court holds that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of a mentally retarded
person of Penry's capacity if the sentencers who impose the death penalty can adequately
consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of mental retardation in their decision. Id.
at 32840.
4. Id. at 319.
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jury must have full consideration of such evidence in order to give its"reasoned moral response" to the defendant's character and crime.5 Yet
Penry and its progeny6 have provided no adequate guidance on what jury
instructions and mitigating factors, apart from those presented in Penry,
would be appropriate in other cases.7 As a result, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has applied such restrictive evidentiary standards to
Penry claims that nearly all are denied apart from those few that proffer the"same" or "similar" evidence found in Penry.5
This Article empirically challenges the legal doctrine underlying Penry
and its progeny. First, it shows that there is no empirical support for the
Texas court's constricted interpretation of the kinds of mitigating evidence
that can provide Penry relief under Article 37.071,1 the former Texas
death penalty statute ("former statute") at issue in Penry.10 Next, it
contends that Penry's whole concept of mitigation and aggravation rests
upon false assumptions concerning the correlates of crime and future
dangerousness. These conclusions are based primarily upon the results of
the "Biosocial Study," one of this country's largest studies of biological
and environmental correlates of crime." The Biosocial Study analyzed
numerous variables predicting crime within a group of nearly five hundred
males who resided in Philadelphia from the time of their birth until their
twenty-second birthday.12 Although there have been many longitudinal
studies of crime and behavioral disorders, no one has been able to examine
so intensively a large sample of individuals both before and after the start
of their criminal careers."3
5. Id. at 328.
6. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
7. See Earhart v. State, 877 S.W.2d 759, 764 (rex. Crim. App. 1994) ("The Court did
not provide a framework to review 'Penry claims' and determine whether the jury was able
to consider and give effect to specific mitigating evidence .... Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's subsequent opinions concerning Penry shed little light on these issues.").
8. See, e.g., Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592, 622 (rex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that
the mitigating evidence presented for a Penry claim "must be the same or of similar character
and quality as that found in Peny").
9. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989). The statute
has been amended since Peny. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp.
1994).
10. Pemy v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 310 (1989).
11. The Study is described in detail in two sources: DEBORAH W. DENNO, BIOLOGY
AND VIOLENCE: FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD (1990) [hereinafter DENNO, BIOLOGY AND
VIOLENCE]; Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Hunian Biology and Criminal Responsibility:
Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1988).
12. See infra notes 165-201 and accompanying text.
13. See generally KENNEH R. NISWANDER & MYRON J. GORDON, THE WOMEN AND
THEIR PREGNANCIES (1972) (describing a collaborative perinatal study, providing some raw
data, and making some general observations on the data); see also Joseph A. McFalls, Social
19941
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The Biosocial Study found no evidence that mental retardation, the
disorder of most significance in Penry, has a significant link to crime or to
future dangerousness when controlling for other influential factors, such as
family characteristics and biological and environmental stressors. The
Biosocial Study did find, however, associations between crime and other
kinds of factors. For example, it reported strong and consistent links
between lead poisoning, family instability, verbal ability, and
crime-factors that the Texas court has either rejected or would be likely
to reject in its review of Penry claims.
This Article also notes that even though the Texas legislature
eventually amended the former statute ("amended statute"), the former
statute still applies to the nearly four hundred inmates on death row in
Texas. 4 Moreover, it is likely that some of the constraints encountered
with the former statute will continue with its amended version despite
language that, on its face, would suggest otherwise.
Many articles and cases have analyzed Penry's doctrine.'5 This
Article takes a different tack by questioning the doctrine's empirical
foundations. It first describes the former Texas death penalty statute and
how the Texas court has applied it in light of Penry, Penry's progeny, and
the Texas court's nexus requirement, which mandates a showing of a direct
link between a mitigating factor and the defendant's crime. Through the
use of various interpretative hurdles, the courts have applied these doctrinal
developments in order to exclude a vast array of mitigating evidence.
Next, this Article discusses the results of the Biosocial Study, the first
ever to report an association between lead poisoning and crime. Lead
poisoning is a new type of mitigating evidence that illustrates the causal
complexities between internal and external factors and behavior, and how
these factors could constitute mitigating evidence. In so doing, this Article
describes an ongoing capital case in Texas that is using the Biosocial
Study's lead poisoning results in the context of its presentation of
mitigating evidence on the defendant's disadvantaged background.
Lastly, this Article critiques the Penry standard and the nexus
requirement in light of the Biosocial Study's results. It suggests that the
Texas court's doctrinal developments would reinforce inappropriately the
Science and the Collaborative Perinatal Project: An Opportunityfor Research, 4 REV. PUB.DATA USa 37, 37 (1976) (noting that a study of children from the time of their birth through
age seven had cost over $100 million). Numerous publications have resulted from examining
these data. See SARAH H. BROMAN Er AL., PRESCHOOL IQ: PRENATAL AND EARLY
DEVELOPMENTAL CORRELATES (1975); JANET B. HARDY ET AL., THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE
(1979); PAUL L. NICHOLS & TA-CHUAN CHEN, MINIMAL BRAIN DYsFuNCTION: A
PROSPECTIVE STUDY (1981).
14. Earhart v. State, 877 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
15. See infra notes 19 & 30.
[Vol 22:001
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types of underlying assumptions behind criminal law defenses. These
assumptions appear to favor seemingly "internal" factors, such as organic
brain damage and mental retardation, over seemingly "external" factors,
such as lead poisoning and other environmental influences. Because there
is no empirical support for this "internal-external" distinction and the
causal assumptions behind it, the Texas court will be calling upon juries to
decide capital cases by applying empirically baseless crtieria.
Because the Texas court provides for some types of mitigating
evidence, its criminal justice system may appear to be fair. The con-
straints, arbitrariness, and erroneous assumptions concerning the types of
mitigating factors found to be acceptable in capital cases, however, make
the reality of the Texas capital litigation process unfair. In light of this
unfairness, this Article suggests that the capital litigation process be more
flexible in considering both internal and external factors in its evaluation
of mitigating evidence, recognizing the doctrinal fiction that fuels Penry.
II. The Texas Death Penalty Statute
In Furman v. Georgia,6 the Supreme Court established that all
existing death penalty statutes were unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause because of their
arbitrary and inconsistent applications.17 Thereafter, all death penalty
states revised their capital sentencing statutes so that they would meet the
perceived requirement for constitutionality."8
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
17. Id. at 428-29 (Douglas, J., concurring). It is unclear if there is an actual Furman
"holding" because each Justice wrote a separate opinion. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 305, 314-15 (1984). Five justices filed separate supporting
opinions in which two positions can be identified. Justices Marshall and Brennan contended
that any method of capital punishment violated the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 360, 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 305 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Rejecting this per se position, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White stated that
existing capital punishment statutes were deficient in their form. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring). They
claimed that the statutes allowed decisionmnakers to have unbridled discretion that resulted in"wanton" or "freakish" capital sentencing patterns. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring). Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist filed
separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
18. See DAVID C. BALDUS Fr. AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 22-24 (1990) (outlining state legislative responses to
Furman).
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A. The Former Texas Death Penalty Statute
In response to Furman, the Texas legislature adopted former Article
37.071, a capital sentencing procedure that was unique in this country. 9
Under former Article 37.071, the jury determined the sentence to be
imposed on a defendant by answering three questions, known as "special
issues:"
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provoca-
tion, if any, by the deceased. 2
These issues were submitted by the trial court during the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial after all the evidence had been presented. 2'
The court had to sentence the defendant to death if the jury provided a
unanimous "yes" answer to each issue submitted; without such unanimity,
the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.'
When the Supreme Court held in 1976 that the death penalty was bot
unconstitutional per se,1 Jurek v. Texas24 was among the five cases the
Court used to set forth the standards for deciding capital cases.' In
Jurek, the joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens deter-
mined that the former Texas death penalty statute was constitutionally
sufficient under the Eighth Amendment because it allowed the jury to
19. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE
OR MISTAKE 114-20 (2d ed., augmented 1981); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath Penry
Wrought?: Mitigating Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 345,
380-84 (1992); see generally Michael Kuhn, Comment, House Bill 200: The Legislative
Attempt to Reinstate Capital Punishment in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REv. 410 (1974).
20. Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § (b)(1)-(3) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
21. Id. §(b).
22. Id. §§ (c)-(e).
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
24. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
25. Gregg, which was the lead case, upheld the constitutionality of the particular capital
sentencing procedure in Georgia. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07. In addition, the Court upheld
the capital sentencing procedure in Florida, Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976), and
Texas, Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276. The Court rejected the mandatory capital sentencing
procedures applied in North Carolina, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976),
and Louisiana, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
[Vol 22:001
HeinOnline  -- 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 6 1994-1995
Testing Penry
consider "particularized circumstances" of the offense and the offender
prior to imposing the death sentence.' Jurek had presented mitigating
evidence of steady employment history and aid for his family's support.'
Even though the terms in the three special issues had not been defined
precisely, the joint opinion accepted the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's
indication that it would interpret the second special issue (concerning the
probability of future dangerousness) so that a jury could consider
"whatever mitigating circumstances" a defendant such as Jurek might want
to bring forth.3 According to these Justices, such an interpretation would
ensure that mitigating factors could be considered and that the death
sentences would not be imposed with the arbitrariness and caprice
invalidated in Furman. Despite that conclusion in Jurek, more than a
decade later the Texas statute was again challenged primarily on the basis
that it prohibited adequate consideration of mitigating evidence,"0 now a
constitutional requirement for imposing the death penalty under Lockett v.
Ohio3' and Eddings v. Oklahoma.3  Although the challenge did not
succeed in Franklin v.. Lynaugh,33 the Court reached a different conclu-
sion a year later in Penry.'
26. urek, 428 U.S. at 273-74 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Four
Justices concurred in the judgment. Id. at 277 (Burger, C.L, concurring); id. at 277 (White,
J., concurring) (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., joining); id. at 279 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
27. Id. at 267.
28. Id. at 272. Jurek's conclusion only pertained to issue two. The Court noted that
because the Texas court had not yet interpreted the first and third issues, it could not be
determined whether the jury could properly consider mitigating circumstances for those issues
as well. The Court speculated, however, that some situations could prompt such consider-
ation. Id. at 272 n.7.
29. Id. at 276.
30. Daniel H. Benson, Texas Capital Sentencing Procedure After Eddings: Some
Questions Regarding Constitutional Validity, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 315, 328-32 (1982); Mary K.
Sicola & Richard R. Shreves, Jury Consideration of Mitigating Evidence: A Renewed
Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Texas Death Penalty Statute, 15 Am. J. CRiM. L. 55,
64-68 (1988).
31. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[The Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments] require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
32. 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) ("Just as the State may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider,
as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.") (emphasis in original).
33. 487 U.S. 164, 183 (1988) (plurality opinion) (determining that the former Texas
statute as applied did not unconstitutionally restrict consideration of the mitigating evidence
of the defendant's good prison disciplinary record and residual doubts concerning the offense).
34. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (concluding that the former Texas
19941
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1. The Penry Standard.-Penry concerned those situations in which
a defendant may present mitigating evidence that is either not relevant to
the three special issues or pertains to the defendant's culpability in a
manner that exceeds the scope of the special issues.' Penry required that
the jury be instructed appropriately so that it could fully consider such
evidence.36 In Penry's case, that meant that although the jury was
allowed to hear evidence of Penry's mental retardation and child abuse, -3 7
such evidence was relevant only to special issue number two (concerning
Penry's future dangerousness). The evidence, therefore, was presented as"aggravating only," because there was no vehicle (such as another special
issue) for allowing a sentencer to view it as mitigating.3" The Court
considered such evidence a "two-edged sword." 39 It was mitigating
because it reduced Penry's ability "to control his impulses or to evaluate
the consequences of his conduct."' 4 But it was also aggravating because
it indicated the probability of his future dangerousness. 4' Because the
special issues in the former Texas statute enabled the jury to give effect to
only the aggravating side of this evidence, Penry's sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment.42
From the start, the Texas court interpreted Penry claims restrictively,
denying all claims apart from those that offered the "same" or "similar"
evidence presented in Penry.43 Yet Penry itself provided no basis for
statute as applied unconstitutionally prohibited consideration of the mitigating evidence of the
defendant's mental retardation and abusive childhood).
35. Id. at 322.
36. See id. at 315 (emphasizing that the special issues must "be interpreted broadly
enough to permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant
might present in imposing a sentence").
37. There was evidence that Penry, who was 22 years old at the time of the crime,
suffered from organic brain damage and mild to moderate retardation based upon a tested IQ
level ranging between 50 and 63 over the years. A clinical psychologist concluded that Penry
had the mental age of a 6 1/2-year-old and the social maturity of a nine or 10-year-old. Id.
at 307-08. There was also evidence that Penry had been subjected to childhood beatings and
abuse which, in addition to birth trauma, may have contributed to his brain damage. Id. at
308-10. Although he was found competent to stand trial, and the jury rejected his insanity
defense, Penry was characterized as "borderline" incompetent and "socially and emotionally
deprived." Id.
38. Id. at 324.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 322.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 328; see also Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2667-68 (1993) (providing
a thorough summary of the Penry opinion); Tobolowsky, supra note 19 (discussing the
Supreme Court decisions applicable to Texas and the death penalty).
43. See, e.g., Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (finding
the defendant's "tragic" family life did not merit Penry relief).
[Vol 22:001
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such strict interpretations. Penry did suggest that the underlying principle
of past precedent' was "that punishment should be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal defendant."' This principle was
based on society's belief "that defendants who commit criminal acts that
are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental
problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such
excuse."'  The Court's dictum, then, focused on the link between
mitigation, the defendant's culpability, and the crime rather than simply the
connection between mitigating evidence and the crime. However, the
Court's general statement gave no indication that only those disorders
evidenced by Penry would be acceptable for Penry relief; indeed, the
words "disadvantaged background" and "emotional and mental disorders"
suggest a wide spectrum. Penry further emphasized that it was constitu-
tionally insufficient merely to allow the defendant to present evidence to
the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to "consider and give
effect" to the evidence to ensure that the defendant is treated as a "uniquely
individual human bein[g]"I and to ensure that the punishment reflects the
sentencer's "reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime."49
With respect to the first issue concerning whether Penry acted
"deliberately," the Court noted that it was not clear that the jury could
fully consider whether Penry's retardation made him less able than a
nonretarded adult "to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences
of his conduct."' 0 With regard to the second issue concerning Penry's
future dangerousness, the Court noted there was no vehicle for the jury to
give mitigating effect to Penry's evidence that his retardation interfered
with his ability to learn from his mistakes."' Furthermore, even if a juror
believed with respect to the third issue that Penry's act of murder was not
a reasonable response to provocation, answering that issue in the affirma-
tive would preclude a juror from expressing an overall view that regard-
less, Penry did not have sufficient moral culpability to be sentenced to
44. Penry, 492 U.S. at 317-20 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S 104 (1982)).
45. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 343 (Brennan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[M'e gauge
whether a punishment is disproportionate by comparing 'the gravity of the offense,'
understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the defendant's moral culpability,
with 'the harshness of the penalty.'") (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 319 (citation omitted).
49. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 322-23.
51. Id. at323.
19941]
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death.5 For this reason, the Court determined that Penry was constitu-
tionally eligible for additional instructions "informing the jury that it could
consider and give effect to [Penry's] mitigating evidence ... by declining
to impose the death penalty."53 At the same time, Penry made clear that
it was not announcing a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague v.
Lane.55
The Supreme Court put a cap on Penry's principles, however, in two
1993 cases, Graham v. CollinS5 6 and Johnson v. TexasY In Graham,
the Court made clear that it did not interpret Penry "as effecting a sea
change" in its evaluation of the constitutionality of the former Texas death
penalty statute for two reasons: (1) Penry did not invalidate the special
issues and (2) Penry made clear that it was not announcing a "new rule"
under Teague."8 Moreover, the Court considered Graham's circumstances
to be different from Penry's. Unlike Penry, the Court stated that Graham's
mitigating evidence (his youth of seventeen years, family transiency,
religiosity, nonviolent character, and devotion to the family) was not
beyond the scope of the special issues because it could have supported a
negative answer to the second issue regarding his future dangerousness.59
The Court was also concerned that if Penry was .applied to include the
kinds of evidence that Graham proffered, it would conflict with Jurek's
determination that youth is provided constitutionally sufficient consideration
under the special issues6°  Moreover, the Court determined that
Graham's evidence of transiency and prior nonviolence "more closely
resembled" Jurek's evidence of youth, steady employment, and family
relationships than Penry's evidence of mental retardation and physical
abuse.6'
Lastly, the Court concluded that Graham's proposed application of
Penry would be so broad and go so far beyond the bounds of prior
precedent that it would essentially require a fourth special issue to be
submitted to the jury: "Does any mitigating evidence before you, whether
52. Id. at 324-25.
53. Id. at 328.
54. Id. at 314-15.
55. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Under Teague, a case proposes a "new rule when it breaks
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the State or Federal Government." Id. at 301.
In Penry, the Court concluded that it was not proposing a new rule because its proposed jury
instructions were established by precedent and it was not attempting to place a "new
obligation" on the State of Texas. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319.
56. 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
57. 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
58. Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 901.
59. Id. at 902.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 903.
[Vol 22:001
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or not relevant to the above [three] questions, lead you to believe that the
death penalty should not be imposed?"6' The Court rejected Graham's
implied proposal of a fourth special issue because it would result in a new
rule under Teague.' Therefore, Teague became the determinative case,
not Penry.64
In Johnson the Court supported its reasoning in Graham and again put
limits on Penry by denying the defendant's claim that the former Texas
statute did not provide sufficient mitigating effect to his youth.' Further-
more, the Court relied on post-Penry standards that it had proposed in
Boyde v. Calyfornia" for structuring the rule of Lockett and Eddings.61
Although the Court acknowledged that under Lockett and Eddings, a
sentencer cannot be prohibited from considering "any aspect" of the
defendant's mitigating evidence,6" it emphasized its later qualification in
Boyde: "States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating
evidence 'in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administra-
tion of the death penalty.'" 69 Johnson also relied on Boyde's proposed
62. Id. at 902.
63. Id. at 903. The Court's analysis in Graham, however, failed to provide a fair
reading of Penry and its progeny. First, the Court declined to view Pery as a broadening
of Jurek or view it as the Court's most recent application of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), two similarly expansive perspectives
of the mitigating evidence requirement that followed Jurek. Rather, the Court depended most
heavily on Jurek, thereby circumventing its decade-long development of a mitigating evidence
standard. Second, Graham asked the wrong question. The issue was not whether Graham's
mitigating evidence more closely resembled Jurek's than Penry's; Penry never held that the
evidence of mental retardation and physical abuse per se was the evidentiary standard for
courts to follow. Rather, the questions in Penry concerned whether a defendant's mitigating
evidence could: (1) become a "two-edged sword;" (2) reduce a defendant's ability to control
his impulses; and (3) impair a defendant's efforts to evaluate the consequences of his conduct.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-24 (1989). If these questions had been considered in
Graham, the Court could not have concluded that the defendant was attempting to introduce
a new rule, only that he was following the Court's most recent standard.
64. Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 902-03 ("[Elven if Pemy reasonably could be read to suggest
that Graham's mitigating evidence was not adequately considered under the former Texas
procedures, that is not the relevant inquiry under Teague."). The Court also concluded that
Graham's new rule did not fall within Teague's two "new rule" exceptions. Id. at 903.
65. Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2670. Because Johnson came before the Court on direct
review, Teague presented no bar to the rule he requested. Id. at 2668.
66. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
67. Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2669.
68. Id. at 2665.
69. Id. at 2666 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S 360, 377 (1990)). In Boyde the
Court set forth a standard for determining whether jury instructions were constitutionally
adequate according to the dictates of Locket and Eddings. A reviewing court must assess
"whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction
in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde, 494
1994]
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standard for determining whether jury instructions meet theLockett-Eddings
rule. According to Boyde, a reviewing court must assess "whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruc-
tion in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant
evidence."70
Based on this standard, the Court explained, without precedent or
support, there was "no reasonable likelihood" that jurors would have
viewed themselves as precluded from considering the potential mitigating
effect of the defendant's age when evaluating his future dangerousness in
special issue two.' Johnson therefore distinguished itself from Penry by
concluding that there was "ample room" for jurors to take account of the
mitigating effects of youth.' In contrast to Penry's mental retardation,
which impeded his ability to learn from mistakes, the Court considered that
the negative effects of youth were open to change over time; consequently,
it presumed that they "are readily comprehended" as mitigating evidence
in the second future dangerousness issue.73 Applying its reasoning in
Graham, the Court emphasized that the defendant's request would require
instructions allowing a jury to "depart from the special issues in every
case," thereby prohibiting the states from structuring the jury's consider-
ation of mitigating evidence.74 This was a result the Court had consistent-
ly rejected.7'
U.S. at 380.
70. Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2669 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380).
71. Id. at 2670.
72. Id. at 2669.
73. Id. at 2670.
It strains credulity to suppose that the jury would have viewed the evidence of
petitioner's youth as outside its effective reach in answering the second special
issue. The relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the
signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness
and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.
Id. at 2669.
74. Id. at 2671-72.
75. Id. at 2672. The Court's analysis in Johnson, however, distorted the defendant's
request as well as Penry's earlier dictates. The defendant was requesting special instructions
for his youth, one type of mitigating evidence that the Court acknowledged had relevance to
the defendant's culpability. Indeed, as the dissent contended, the Court had made clear in
Eddings "that the vicissitudes of youth bear directly on the young offender's culpability and
responsibility for the crime." Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Mouth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history
is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment expected of adults.
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Since Johnson, the Court has vacated several death sentences and
remanded the cases to the Texas court so that they can be reevaluated in
light of Penry or Johnson.76 Although in each case the defendant intro-
duced mitigating evidence of a mental impairment, in no case was the
evidence identical to that in Penry. None of the defendants was mentally
retarded and some did not indicate a history of child abuse.' Therefore,
these cases suggest that, irrespective of its holdings in Graham and
Johnson, the Court considers mental impairment apart from retardation to
be eligible relief under Penry.'8
2. The Nexus Requirement.-In addition to the Penry standard, the
Texas court also created a requirement whereby defendants must demon-
strate a "nexus" between the mitigating evidence and those aspects of the
offense that suggest the defendant is less morally culpable and therefore,
less deserving of death.79 The Texas court first implied such a connecting
Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
Neither the defendant's particular request nor Penry would require special instructions
for the jury to depart from the special issues in "every case" because not all evidence may
be sufficiently relevant or outside the ambit of Pemy. Furthermore, in comparing the
evidence of youth with that of mental retardation, the Court seemed to be introducing an
additional requirement for mitigating factors that had not been previously specified-a
requirement of permanency and predictions of future behavior. According to the Court, the
transiency of youth implied that at some point a defendant would be sufficiently mature to
learn from his mistakes, in contrast to a mentally retarded person who would never be able
to do so. Yet the Court read the issue as forward only, not considering that because of the
defendant's youth, he has not yet been able to learn from his mistakes. Moreover, even at
this point, if he had not yet learned from his mistakes, there was a high likelihood that he
would never be able to do so, thereby suggesting the "double-edged sword" danger
highlighted in Penry. In general, then, although Johnson was more true to the Penry language
than Graham, it introduced conditions and presumptions that the Court had not made clear
either in Penry or in Jurek.
76. See, e.g., Lucas v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 3029 (1993); Hawkins v. Texas, 113 S. Ct.
3029 (1993); Earhart v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 3026 (1993); Granviel v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 3027
(1993); Richardson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 3026 (1993).
77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Crane v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 432 (1980) (No.
94-5334).
78. Id.
79. See Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941, 951 (rex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that
evidence which the defendant claims is mititating "is relevant to the individualized assessment
of the propriety of the death penalty for the offender if there is a nexus between this evidence
and the circumstances of the offense which tends to excuse or explain the commission of the
offense"); Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ("Evidence of the
appellant's unfortunate childhood was not, without some testimony indicating a nexus between
his childhood circumstances and the commission of the crime, helpful to the jury's
consideration of the special issues or indicative of a lessened moral blameworthiness."); Goss
v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ("None of the evidence presented by
[the defendant's] witnesses sought to explain the connection between the apparently isolated
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link one year after Penry, ° although the nexus requirement was not made
explicit until another year later in a footnote in Lackey v. State.8t  It
would be another year before a majority of the Texas court in Nobles v.
State' would apply the nexus requirement to reject a Penry claim:' 3
Evidence of the appellant's unfortunate childhood was not, without
some testimony indicating a nexus between his childhood circum-
stances and the commission of the crime, helpful to the jury's
consideration of the special issues or indicative of a lessened moral
blameworthiness. 84
Today, the nexus requirement is considered "settled law" and
established precedent for those defendants sentenced under the former
Texas statute.' Thus, even if a defendant could satisfy the Penry
standard, the nexus requirement provides an additional hurdle. Yet
members of the Texas court have consistently questioned the requirement's
constitutionality in the numerous cases in which it has been applied.'
problems of childhood and the commission of the crime."). For a thorough description of the
development of the nexus requirement, see Mines, 852 S.W.2d at 956-59 (Baird, J.,
dissenting).
80. See Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 76 (rex. Crim. App. 1990) (commenting that
the defendant's childhood experiences and mental illness "are widely regarded, according to
some contemporary social standards, as redeeming personality traits or factors which tend to
ameliorate fault").
81. 819 S.W.2d 111, 135 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Justice O'Connor seems to further require some nexus between the mitigating evidence
and culpability for the crime. If moral or personal 6ulpability is reduced only when the
criminal act (murder) is "attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional
and mental problems," then mitigating evidence relevant to the defendant's character,
background, mental condition or circumstances of the offense must also be connected
with or somehow help to explain or excuse the commission of the offense by the
defendant.
Id. (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
82. 843 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
83. A plurality of the Texas court has used the requirement in two previous cases. See
Richardson (Miguel) v. State, 886 S.W.2d 769, 775 (rex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that the
defendant had not demonstrated "any connection between alleged childhood abuse and its
subsequent effect" on him and concluding that "[there is simply no Penry evidence presented
by [his] nexus argument"), vacated, Richardson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 3026 (1993), t'd, No.
68,934, 1994 WL 232383 at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 1, 1994); Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d
162, 166 (rex. Crim. App. 1992) (concluding that the defendant's mitigating evidence did not
meet the Penry standard because the defendant had not presented testimony concerning "any
mental disorder or physiological damage" that would account for why he was less morally
culpable and there was no evidence to explain the connection between the defendant's
childhood problems and his crime).
84. Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 506 (rex. Crim. App. 1992).
85. Richardson (DamonJerome) v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874,884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
86. See Mines, 852 S.W.2d at 952 (Baird, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) ("I find no
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The requirement's potential impermissibility was also recognized in Lackey
when it was first mentioned. There the Texas court noted that the
requirement would conflict with the set doctrine of Lockett and Ed-
dings," which mandates that the sentencer be allowed to consider as
mitigation, "in all but the rarest kind of capital case," any part of the
defendant's character, record, or offense that is introduced at trial.89
B. Restrictions on Penry Relief
The Texas court and.the Fifth Circuit have so restricted the Penry (and
progeny) standard and the nexus requirement that Penry relief pertaining
to special issues one and two has been granted in only a half dozen
cases. 0 Such restrictions rest on five primary hurdles:
(1) Penry claims can be granted only if they satisfy the Texas court's
Penry standard, namely, the "same" or "similar" evidence as in
Penry.
(2) Penry claims can be granted only if they pass the Texas court's
nexus requirement, which:
(a) proposes an ill-defined standard of connection or causation
that cannot be satisfied by evidence that does not meet the
Penry standard;91
(b) focuses on the link between the mitigating evidence and the
crime, in contrast to Penry's requirement that the evidence
be linked to the defendant's culpability and the crime. 2
basis in Penry, or in its predecessors, for requiring a nexus between a defendant's mitigating
evidence and the charged offenses); Richardson (Miguel), 1994 WL 232383 at *2 (Clinton,
J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's "rote invocation of its own homemade nexus
requirement" has no support in either Johnson or Penry).
87. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
88. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
89. Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 135 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Lockett,
438 U.S. at 605).
90. These restrictions are discussed infra notes 97-139 and accompanying text.
91. The Texas court "[does] not require proof of a nexus when the defendant presents
evidence of mental retardation." Earhart v. State, 877 S.W.2d 759, 765 n.9 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994); see also Richard v. State, 842 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting
that "since Nobles was decided, the Court has still not required an express showing of 'nexus'
between evidence of mental defectiveness and the offense on trial").
92. See Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941, 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Baird, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the nexus requirement distorts Penry's intent because it prevents the
jury from considering those factors pertaining to the defendant's character and background that
may be relevant and yet not-connected to the offense charged).
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(4) The Gribbles "mental illness" exception, which is the only time
that the Texas court has deviated from its "same" or "similar"
Penry evidence standard, has not since been followed and may
well never be.96
(5) When the Supreme Court remands a Texas court case so that it
may be considered further in light of Johnson, the Texas court
has interpreted this mandate as pertaining only to the issue of the
defendant's age, without reference to other mitigating factors.
Yet the cases that the Supreme Court remands include a vast
array of mitigating evidence apart from age.
1. "Same" or "Similar" Evidence.-Penry claims are granted only if
the accused introduces evidence of retardation,97 generally considered to
be an IQ of less than seventy,9" irrespective of any other severe mental
impairment. For example, the Texas court has rejected claims by defen-
dants presenting evidence of a broad range of disorders: mental dysfunc-
tion requiring commitment to a mental institution;99 limited mental
capability and physical abuse by a father; ° irreversible organic brain
damage resulting in uncontrollable violence, personality change, and
blackouts;101 psychiatric testimony of psychological and psychiatric
problems and "not dealing with a full deck;""1ca and manic depressive
95. Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65 ('rex. Crim. App. 1990).
96. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
97. See Ex Parte McGee, 817 SAV.2d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. -1991); Ex Parte Goodman,
816 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991).
98. See AMERicAN PSYCHIATRIC AssociATioN, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DisoRDERs 39 (4th ed., 1994) ("The essential feature of mental retardation is
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning... that is accompanied by significant
limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication,
self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety."). There are four degrees of
severity of retardation:
1. Mild IQ level 50-55 to approximately 70
2. Moderate IQ level 35-40 to 50-55
3. Severe IQ level 20-25 to 35-40
4. Profound IQ level below 20 or 25
Id. at 40. There are a variety of ways to measure retardation and a wide range of factors
that can influence performance. See id. at 39-46.
99. Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
100. Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
101. Ex Parte Crane, No. 71,250, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 1992).
102. Earhart v. State, 877 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
[Vol 22:001
HeinOnline  -- 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 16 1994-1995
Testing Penry
damage resulting in uncontrollable violence, personality change, and
blackouts;' 0' psychiatric testimony of psychological and psychiatric
problems and "not dealing with a full deck;"'0 and manic depressive
illness."0 3 In each case, the Texas court rejected the claim for relief
because the evidence was not similar to that presented in Penry. Recently,
the Fifth Circuit applied a comparably constrained approach."' 4  It
concluded that the defendant's low IQ did not indicate that he was mentally
retarded and, therefore, could not be considered mitigating evidence
outside the realm of the special issues.t"5
The Texas court has not softened its stance over time. Moreover, it
has used Johnson to focus on the issue of the defendant's age, irrespective
of other kinds of mitigating evidence. In Lucas v. Texas,"'6 for example,
the defense presented evidence that the defendant: (1) suffered from
chronic schizophrenia; (2) evidenced two, personality disorders, "a
schizotypical personality and elements of sociopathic personality;" (3)
experienced seizures at school that made him an "outcast;" (4) was
victimized by his mother's physical and mental abuse that led him later to
feel resentment toward females; (5) was of low-average intelligence (an IQ
of eighty-four); and (6) had -past episodes of attempted suicide and
commitments to mental health institutions." Yet upon remand from the
Supreme Court with instructions to follow Johnson, the Texas court
focused on Lucas's age and .not his disabilities. By noting that Lucas was
forty-three when he committed the offense, in contrast to Johnson who was
only nineteen, the Texas court merely concluded that "youth is not a factor
in the instant case."' The Texas court denied Penry relief without
squarely addressing Lucas's other disorders.
By using the nexus requirement, the Texas court has ensured that only
mitigating evidence directly comparable to that introduced in Penry is
sufficient for Penry relief."9 As a result, defendants' claims of mitigat-
ing evidence are consistekitly rejected either because they do not demon-
101. Ex Parte Crane, No. 71,250, slip op. at 5 ('ex. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 1992).
102. Earhart v. State, 877.S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).103. Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941, 947-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
104. Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994).
105. Id. at 630.
106. 877 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
107. Id. at 317.
108. Id. According to the three justices who dissented, "Whe majority pretends the
Supreme Court remanded this cause to reconsider the matter of age, all the while ignoring that
it pointedly cautioned, 'Penry remains the law and must be given a fair reading.'" Id.
(Clinton, Baird, & Overstreet JT., dissenting) (qioting Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658,
2670 (1993)).
109. Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Baird, J.,
dissenting).
19941
HeinOnline  -- 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 17 1994-1995
AM. J. CRIM. L.
strate a sufficient nexus in the minds of the Texas court or because they are
irrelevant."' In Richardson v. State,"' for example, the Texas court
affirmed a death sentence by concluding that Article 37.071 did not
unconstitutionally preclude the jury from considering evidence of the
defendant's disadvantaged upbringing, which included poverty, parental
neglect, illiteracy, learning disabilities, and stuttering."2  The court
stated that the evidence was not mitigating because there was no nexus
between the defendant's disadvantaged life and the circumstances of his
crime that would "excuse or explain" his acts and demonstrate that the
death sentence was improper."' The court noted that its determination
may have differed if Richardson had shown that his mother had taught him
to commit murder or other violent crimes or if the murder he committed
had begun as a robbery."4 The court reasoned that this evidence "might
indicate that his personality had been damaged through no fault of his own
and that his capital crime was caused in part by that personality."" 5
By focusing on the link between the defendant's mitigating evidence
and his crime, however, irrespective of the considerably stronger potential
link between the evidence and his culpability, the Texas court applies a
requirement that is nearly impossible to meet. Unless there is evidence that
Richardson's parent specifically trained him to commit a homicide, no
nexus can ever be shown.
110. For example, in Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), the
Texas court held that the defendant's evidence of positive behavior (he was religious and
loving to his family) fell within the scope of the second special issue. The evidence
describing the defendant's development of his artistic abilities, however, was considered
irrelevant to an individualized determination of the defendant's eligibility for a death sentence.
Id.
111. 879 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
112. Id. at 883. The defendant offered the following evidence at trial:
[ills mother was "in and out" of penal institutions and had little to do with his
upbringing; that he never knew his father; that when he was very young, he and
his six siblings were raised by his maternal grandmother in substantial poverty
and with little supervision; that sometimes he and his siblings went hungry; that
sometimes "they would go out and steal, go in other people's houses [looking for]
food.., to survive;" that the defendant got "in trouble with the law. . . twelve
times. .. for stealing something to eat;" that sometimes, when his mother was
around, she "would go in the stores and entertain the clerks while the children
[were] taking food-taking clothes and what they wanted out of the stores;" that
when the defendant was nine or ten, he was sent by state authorities to the Texas
Boys Ranch and later, to the Giddings State School; that when he arrived at the
Texas Boys Ranch, he was illiterate, stuttered badly, and was a "slow learner;"
and that he was released from state care when he was 15 or 16.
Id.
113. Id. at 884.
114. Id. at 885.
115. Id.
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In E Parte Crane"6 the Texas court further relied on the nexus
requirement and the Penry standard in rejecting the petitioner's claim that
a motorcycle accident resulting in irreversible brain damage, uncontrollable
behavior, and personality changes, contributed to Crane's homicidal
conduct six years later."17 Most recently in Earhart v. State,"' the
Texas court reaffirmed the nexus requirement and Penry standard by
distinguishing evidence of mental retardation from evidence of substance
abuse, which it found did not make the defendant less morally culpable for
the crime."9  Moreover, the defendant's evidence of psychological
problems ("low ego strength" and "psychotic decompensation") was not
considered relevant for mitigation because there was no indication that his
problems were somehow linked to the commission of the offense." The
Fifth Circuit has shown a comparable reliance on the nexus require-
ment.121
2. Additional Standards and Requirements.-It is unlikely that the
Texas court's nexus requirement will be challenged effectively. Even
though cases are consistently remanded by the Supreme Court with a
memorandum order to vacate the judgment and reconsider according to
Penry, and more recently, Johnson, the Texas court merely reaffirms its
prior finding."tm Moreover, Richardson demonstrates that the Texas
116. No. 71,250 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 1992).
117. See id., slip op. at 5 ("While Penry's evidence could reasonably be thought to
excuse or explain, at least in part, his criminal conduct, the jury in [Mr. Crane's] case could
not reasonably infer from his written medical records that his 1987 criminal conduct was
attributable in any way to his 1981 motorcycle accident.").
118. 877 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
119. Id. at 767.
120. Id.
121. See Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that although there
was a "clear nexus between Penry's handicap and his criminal act," there was insufficient
evidence that the defendant's criminal conduct in this case was attributable to the evidence of
his antisocial personality); Motley v. Collins, 3 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a
Penry claim when the petitioner "failed to explore the nexus between the allegedly mitigating
evidence and the crime itself"); Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir. 1993)
("Under precedent in this circuit, evidence of a defendant's background is constitutionally
relevant mitigating evidence only if the crime committed... is in some sense 'attributable'
to that background. While 'attribution' does not require a precise nexus between such
background evidence and the crime, at a minimum the evidence must permit a rational jury
to 'infer that the crime is attributable, at least in part, to the defendant's background.'")
(citation omitted); Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a Penry
claim because there was insufficient evidence establishing that the defendant's "criminal
conduct was 'attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental
problems'").
122. See Richardson (Miguel) v. Texas, No. 68,934, 1994 WL 232383 at *1 (Tex. Crim.
1994]
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court appears to apply an increasingly rigorous interpretation of what it
means by "nexus."
In Earhart, the Texas court noted that it has provided Penry relief in
only three circumstances:" (1) when there is evidence of mental
retardation, which falls beyond the scope of the special issues;" (2)
when there is evidence of mental illness, which may fall beyond the scope
of the special issues;"z and (3) when the special issues failed to allow the
jury a proper vehicle for considering evidence of provocation by a second
victim in a prosecution for capital murder."
The Texas court has granted Penry relief in only five cases relating to
the first circumstance and only one case relating to the second. Penry
relief cases for the first circumstance concerning mental retardation merely
reaffirm the previously stated proposition that the Texas court allows
claims for evidence that are the "same" or "similar" to Penry's.1z The
single Penry relief case for the second circumstance concerning mental
illness, Gribble v. State, is a clear exception;" it is unlikely that
App. June 1, 1994) ("This case is here on second remand from the United States Supreme
Court for us again to consider appellant's Penry claim in light of Johnson v. Texas. We
affirmed appellant's conviction on the first remand and held the trial court did not err in
failing to submit appellant's requested Penry charge at the punishment phase of his trial. We
again affirm.") (citations omitted); Zimmerman v. Texas, 881 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Tex: Crim.
App. 1994) ("On original submission, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this
case. The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted appellant's petition for writ of
certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded this case for further consideration in light of
Johnson v. Texas. We will again affirm.") (citations omitted).
123. Earhart v. State, 877 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
124. See Richard v. State, 842 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (involving low I.Q.
and child abuse that may have resulted in sociopathic personality disorder); )Zxparre Williams,
833 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (involving mental retardation); Ex parte McGee,
817 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (involving mental retardation); Ramirez v. State, 815
S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (involving low I.Q.); Exparle Goodman, 816 S.W.2d
383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (involving mental retardation and possible brain damage).
125. See Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65 (rex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2856 (1991) (involving traumatic childhood, including sexual abuse by his mother).
In Gribble, the Texas court reversed the trial court's denial of requested jury instructions,
holding that the defendant was not provided a means by which the jury could sufficiently
consider his mitigating evidence. Id. at 76. Note, however, that Gribble was decided before
the Texas court's development of the nexus requirement.
126. First v. State, 846 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
128. 808 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
129. In Gribble, the Texas court reversed a trial court's conviction and sentence of death
based on its finding that the jury was unable to "consider and give effect to" the defendant's
mitigating evidence. Id. at 76. The defendant offered testimony describing his "troubled and
insecure childhood," which he attributed to the institutionalization of both parents while he
was still an infant-his mother for mental illness and his father for burglary. Id. at 75. While
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Gribble would be applied again. 3
Even within the constricted application of the current nexus require-
ment, the Texas court has applied a variety of inconsistent standards. In
Goss v. State,' for example, the Texas court was consistent with
Gribble in concluding that the defendant's mitigating evidence did not meet
the Penry standard because it did not show "any mental disorder or
physiological damage... that would help explain why he 'was less
morally culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.""' In
Nobles, however, the Texas court made clear that "unless a direct
correlation can be drawn between the use of drugs and a defendant's
aberrational behavior, we have determined that such usage is fully
encompassed within the scope" of the Texas statute.'
a young child, he and his siblings were continually placed among different relatives, causing
him to experience considerable residential instability. Id. When his mother was finally
released from confinement and divorced from his father, he lived with her, her new husband,
and his siblings in a rural shack without running water. Thereafter, his stepfather
disappeared, leaving his pregnant mother without food for the family. His mother
subsequently spent her time in bars, often bringing strange men home at night, leaving the
children with "no responsible adult figure." Id.
According to the Texas court, the defendant's mental and emotional condition was
"abnormal" due to these circumstances. Moreover, a psychoanalyst testified that the
defendant eventually disclosed to him that his mother sexually abused him on two occasions
when he was a small child. Id. Lastly, the psychoanalyst testified that "even if [the
defendant's sexual experiences] were untrue fantasies, [they] provided a substantial explanation
for the appellant's subsequent history of violence, and how the contrast of his violent behavior
with his positive personality traits were indicative of severe mental illness, depression, and
psychotic illusions of the kind experienced by his mother." Id. The Texas court viewed these
circumstances "as redeeming personality traits or factors which tend to ameliorate fault." Id.
at 76. For this reason, a sentencer "must be authorized to mitigate punishment if it finds that
a defendant's personal moral culpability was thereby reduced." Id.
130. There are several aspects of Gribble that may explain why it was an exception to
the "same" or "similar" Penry evidence standard that the Texas court has followed. First,
it was decided in 1990, prior to the Texas court's development of the nexus requirement. It
is questionable whether that requirement, put in the context of the Penry and progeny
standard, would allow for the jury's consideration of mental illness today. The Texas court's
current approach suggests that such an allowance would be unlikely. Second, Gribble focused
on the relationship between the defendant's circumstances and his moral culpability, only
addressing how the circumstances could relate to his crime (a possible rape, kidnapping, and
homicide). Again, it is doubtful that Gribble would be able to demonstrate a direct link
between his circumstances and his offense under the Texas court's current requirements.
Moreover, Gribble never introduced evidence of mental retardation or even low intelligence.
As this Article has noted, defendants with illnesses and family background experiences that
are far more serious than those presented in Gribble have not been successful in winning
Penry claims. It appears, then, that Gribble may have been a fluke.
131. 826 S.W.2d 162 (rex. Crim. App. 1992).
132. Id. at 166.
133. Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 507 (rex. Crim. App. 1992). Courts interpreting
HeinOnline  -- 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 21 1994-1995
AM. J. CRIM. L.
Yet even if a defendant can get beyond the Penry standard and nexus
requirement, there are additional hurdles that the Fifth Circuit has put
forth. For example, as this Article mentioned in its discussion of age,' 34
Graham implied that permanency may be a requirement for a mitigating
circumstance; if a condition is not permanent, the evidence is sufficiently
addressed by the second issue. The Court considered age to be a "transito-
ry" condition.3 Likewise, in Black v. Collins, 136 the Fifth Circuit
held that evidence of the defendant's good character prior to Vietnam did
not require a special instruction because there was "no evidence to show
that he suffered from a permanent emotional or mental impairment arising
from his military service in Vietnam." 17
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that evidence is mitigating only
if it is not due to the fault of the defendant; otherwise, it cannot be
considered to reduce the defendant's culpability.' Thus, substance
abuse and voluntary intoxication are not mitigating because they are not
"uniquely severe permanent handicaps with which the defendant was
burdened through no fault of his own." 3 9 However, the Texas court
has primarily denied Penry claims with the blanket explanation that the
defendant's mitigating evidence could be sufficiently considered and "given
effect to" within the Texas statute.
C. The Amended Texas Death Penalty Statute
Despite the Texas court's narrowness, the Texas Legislature applied
an expansive approach to its interpretation of Penry, which resulted in the
amendment of the Texas statute in 1991. 40 During the regular session
the standard in Penry, however, have improperly focused on Penry's disabilities, rather than
the basis for his culpability. The issue in Penry was not that he suffered from mental
retardation or from an abusive childhood, but that these were among a number of conditions
contributing to his inability to control his behavior and learn from past mistakes. Evaluating
the potency of conditions contributing to these disorders, and not retardation and child abuse
per se, was the point to be learned from Pemy.
134. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
135. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 924 (1993).
136. 962 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2983 (1992).
137. Id. at 405.
138. Bamard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct.
2937 (1992).
139. Id. at 639.
140. TEx. CODE CrUM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1994); Act of May 17,
1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2898, 2900; see also Graham v.
Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1013 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing the background of the amended
Texas statute), aft'd, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Tobolowski, supra note 19, at 380-84 (discussing
the history and background of the amended Texas statute).
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following Penry, the legislature concluded that statutory changes were
needed so that mitigating factors could be more fully considered.'14  In
contrast to the conflict created when the former Texas statute was enacted,
this time the Texas Senate and House generally agreed that statutory
changes were needed. 42 Although the Texas Legisature's and court's
different responses to Penry in 1991 were less than two weeks apart, the
legislature acted first. 43
Generally, the house and senate agreed to delete the first and third
special issues concerning, respectively, deliberate conduct and provocation,
although both chambers concluded that the "continuing threat" issue should
be retained. Moreover, both agreed to changes that would prohibit the
improper exclusion of mitigating evidence at sentencing.'" This was
accomplished, through an express statement to "includ[e] evidence of the
defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense
that mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty." 45 Moreover,
the legislature also included an expansive jury instruction for determining
the "continuhIg threat" and new causation/intent issues (if they applied) so
that the jury would consider all evidence presented at the guilt and
punishment stages." Most importantly, the legislature added a new
mitigating circumstances issue that the jury would have to answer if it
answered the "continuing threat" and causation/intent issues affirmative-
ly. 47 The legislature's changes apply to all offenses committed on or
after September 1, 1991.
The follo.ving provisions of the amended statute are most applicable
to the discussion in this Article. The amended statute first presents two
special issues that the jury must consider:
(1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
141. See generally J. Dwight Carmichael, Note, Penry v. Lynaugh: Texas Death Penalty
Procedure Unconstitutionally Precludes Jury Consideration of Mitigating Evidence, 42
BAYLOR L. REv. 347, 370 (1990) (quoting H.B. 89, 71st Leg., 1st C.S. (1989)).
142. Tobolowsky, supra note 19, at 380.
143. The legislative changes to the former statute were passed in the Texas House on
May 14, 1991, and in the Senate on May 17, 1991. Act of May 17, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S.,
ch. 838, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2898, 2901. The Texas court's response to Peny began
in a group of decisions delivered on May 29, 1991. See, e.g., Exparte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d
528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992); Selvage v. Collins, 816
S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
144. For a thorough discussion of the history and background of the amended Texas
statute, see Tobolowski, supra note 19, at 380-84.
145. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(a) (West Supp. 1994).
146. Id. § 2(d)(1).
147. Id. § 2(e).
148. Id. § 2(1).
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to society; and
(2) in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage
permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty as a party under
Sections 7.01 and 7.02, Penal Code, whether the defendant
actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually cause
the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or
another or anticipated that a human life would be taken.'
The statute then requires a specific jury charge:
[i]n deliberating on the issues submitted under Subsection (b) of
this Article, it shall consider all evidence admitted at the guilt or
innocence stage or the punishment stage, including evidence of the
defendant's background or character or circumstances of the
offense that militates for or mitigates against the imposition of the
death penalty. 50
Lastly, the statute requires a third special issue if issues (1) and (2) above
are answered in the affirmative:
(3) Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including
the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and
background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant,
there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to
warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than the death
sentence be imposed.'
If the jury under the amended statute returns unanimous affirmative
findings for the "continuing threat" and causation/intent (if applicable)
issues, plus a unanimous negative finding for the mitigating circumstances
issue, the court must apply the death penalty.' The court must sentence
the defendant to confinement for life, however, if any one of the three
following circumstances occur: (1) the jury returns a negative finding for
the "continuing threat" or causation/intent issues; (2) the jury returns an
affirmative finding for the mitigating circumstances issue; or (3) the jury
is not able to answer any of the submitted sentencing issues."'
On its face, the amended statute appears to more fully accommodate
the constitutional requirements for adequate consideration of mitigation
evidence under Penry and its more restrictive progeny." For example,
although Justice Thomas has stated that he believes Penry was "wrongly
149. Id. §2(b)(1), (2).
150. Id. § 2(d)(1).
151. Id. §2(e).
152. Id. §2(g).
153. Id.
154. Tobolowski, supra note 19, at 384-94.
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decided,"' 5 and that it represents the Court's most "extreme statement"
in its "mitigating line," 56 he also believes that the Texas legislature's
amendment was a "predictable" consequence of Penry.157
The amended statute also appears to have rendered obsolete the Texas
court's nexus requirement given its addition of a specific jury charge and
a third special issue for mitigating evidence. But, while nexus is no longer
expressly an appellate issue under the amended statute, it is foreseeable that
a prosecutor will argue in summation what is essentially a nexus issue
when discussing the mitigating circumstances that the defense has
presented. Thus, the amended statute will have moved the nexus issue
from the appellate court (which substituted its opinion for that of the jury)
to the trial court.' Even though Texas jurors will be making decisions
about the impact of certain mitigating evidence, it can be expected that
some kind of nexus between the mitigating evidence and the defendant's
culpability and crime will be required to turn them away from the death
penalty. It bears reminding, for example, that Penry received a death
sentence upon retrial under the former Texas statute despite the court's
grant of special instructions for his mitigating evidence." 9
From an empirical standpoint, the Texas court's emphasis on Penry-
only evidence in deciding Penry claims is also extremely limited. Although
there is some evidence of a link between mental retardation and crime,"W
numerous other factors, which the Texas court has shunned in its applica-
tion of Penry, have also been found to be associated with crime. These
include: low socioeconomic status, family instability, poor verbal ability,
low school achievement, learning disabilities,' and mental disorder.'6
155. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 904.
157. Id. at 913 n.9.
158. See Tobolowsky, supra note 19, at 393-94 ("Rather than merely engrafting
consideration of mitigating circumstances into the responses to the 'aggravating' circumstances
issue(s), the legislature has also given Texas capital jurors the ability to 'consider and give
effect to' a defendant's mitigating evidence by 'declining to impose the death penalty.'")
(quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)).
159. Id. at 394 n.225.
160. See EMILY F. REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17 (1993).
161. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRENSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN
NATURE (1985) (discussing how factors such as low intelligence, broken and abusive families,
low socioeconomic status, and difficulty in school are associated with crime); KEVIN N.
WRIGHT & KAREN E. WRIGHT, FAMILY LIFE, DELINQUENCY, AND CRIME: A
POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE (1994) (discussing how children who grow up in homes with
considerable conflict and lack of supervision are at great risk for becoming delinquent).
162. See WILSON & HERRENSTEIN, supra note 161, at 173-209 (1985) (suggesting a link
between mental disorder and crime); NATHANIEL J. PALLONE, MENTAL DISORDER AMONG
PRISONERS: TOWARD AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVENTORY 34, 147 (1991) (reporting that 74% of
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Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that no link exists between
mental retardation and crime when other factors are taken into account) 63
the prison population in a study using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MvMPI) could be classified as psychologically disordered). Pallone notes that the 74% figure
is nearly four times greater than that reported for the general population. Id. According to
Pallone, however, this discrepancy is attributable in part to the demographic composition of
correctional inmates, which is disproportionately male, non-White, and from the lower
socioeconomic classes. Id. at 24-25. Relative to Whites, non-Whites have a higher incidence
of organic brain disorders, mental deficiency, and psychosocial dysfunction. Id. at 27.
Furthermore, psychosocial dysfunction increases as socioeconomic status (SES) decreases. Id.
at 28. Thus, for example, the high incidence of neuropsychiatric or neurogenic mental
disorders among prisoners is consistent with the disproportionate incidence of head trauma
found among Blacks and low SES individuals. Id. at 93-95. Pallone concludes, then, that
"[g]iven the demographic differences between the general population and imprisoned offenders
(who are disproportionately male, non-White, and from the lower socioeconomic strata), the
inflected prevalence of mental disorder among offenders seems to resemble that among the
relevant reference groups in the general population." Id. at 147.
Other reviews of research studies conclude that an association between violence and
mental disorder exists even when controls are provided for key demographic factors. See
John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGiST 511 (1992). As Monahan states:
Whether the measure is the prevalence of violence among the disordered or the
prevalence of disorder among the violent, whether the sample is people who are selected
for treatment as inmates or patients in institutions or people randomly chosen from the
open community, and no matter how many social and demographic factors are
statistically taken into account, there appears to be a relationship between mental
disorder and violent behavior.
Id. at 519. Yet Monahan's conclusion is based on a major qualification that may distinguish
it from Pallone's. As Monahan emphasizes, "It is only people currently experiencing
psychotic symptoms who may be at increased risk of violence. Being a former patient in a
mental hospital-that is, having experienced psychotic symptoms in the past-bears no direct
relationship to violence, and bears an indirect relationship to violence only in the attenuated
sense that previous disorder may raise the risk of current disorder." Id.
Other research has examined the link between crime and mental disorder using measures
other than the MIPI, which some have criticized because it was designed in part to
distinguish between offenders and nonoffenders. See Robert F. Krueger et al., Personality
Traits Are Linked to Crime Among Men and Women: Evidence From a Birth Cohort, 103 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 328, 329 (1994). The Krueger study examined the link between
personality and criminal or delinquent behavior in both males and females using the
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ), which was not designed to differentiate
between offenders and nonoffenders, but to allow identification of numerous personality traits
that could be linked to crime. Id. This study determined that, for both genders, greater
delinquent participation was associated with more aggression, alienation, greater stress
reactivity, less traditionalism, and less self-control. Id. at 335.
163. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 70-95. Although a
considerable amount of research has examined the relationship between intelligence and crime,
id. at 10-12, there has been scant attention paid to mental retardation as a separate category.
According to Pallone, prisoners evidence a higher incidence of mental retardation relative to
the general population, although the disparity is not as great as that found with mental illness.
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Indeed, researchers emphasize their failure to detect strong or consistent
predictors of crime in general.Y4
In light of these circumstances, the following sections examine the
results of the Biosocial Study to determine the strength of the relationship
between certain factors which could be considered mitigating, and crime.
The Study analyzed the following issues: (1) whether there is a relation-
ship between mental retardation and crime, as Penry suggests; (2) whether
factors other than retardation show a stronger relationship to crime; and (3)
whether any one or combination of factors apart from retardation can meet
the standard currently used in the Texas court's nexus requirement and the
standard which may be suggested or implied under the amended Texas
statute. Contrary to much prior empirical research, the Biosocial Study
examined numerous variables collected on individuals who are, demograph-
ically, at a high risk for the death penalty.
"iH. An Empirical Analysis of Penry Evidence
The 987 subjects who participated in the Biosocial Study Were born at
Philadelphia's Pennsylvania Hospital between 1959 and 1962.11 All
See PALLONE, supra note 162, at 147. For example, a 1985 survey of prison administrators
found that mentally retarded inmates constituted approximately two percent of the prison
population, id. at 39, relative to approximately 1.5% of the general population. Id. at 40.
The incidence among non-Whites was greater than among Whites at a ratio of 161%. Id.
This demographic disparity may account in part for Pallone's general conclusion that "mental
retardation among imprisoned offenders exceeds that in the general population by 50%." Id.
at 147. Relative to his discussion of mental illness, however, Pallone engaged in limited
discussion of the other factors associated with mental retardation that could also be linked to
crime. Others suggest that the relationship between intelligence and crime is curvilinear.
Whereas most offenders occupy the normal or borderline subnormal IQ levels that range from
60 to 00, "their relative frequencies decline on either side of this range." WILSON &
HERRNSTEIN, supra note 161, at 155. Thus, offenders may have generally lower intelligence
test scores, but they are not disproportionately mentally retarded.
164. See generally John Monahan, Causes of Violence, in DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 77 (United States Sentencing Commission ed., 1993); John Monahan, People with
Mental Disorder and People Who Offend: Collecting Valid Data, 4 CRIM. BEHAv. &
MENTAL HEALTH 68 (1994).
165. The subjects and their families were originally part of the Collaborative Perinatal
Project, one of the largest medical projects ever conducted in this country. In 1957, the
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke launched the Collaborative Perinatal
Project, a nationwide study of biological and environmental influences on pregnancy, and
infant and childhood mortality, as well as on physical, neurological, and psychological
development in children. Nearly 60,000 pregnant women participated in the study between
1959 and 1966 in 15 different medical centers. One of these medical centers was located in
Philadelphia. Examination of the children from the time of their birth through age seven
continued until 1974. NiSWANDER & GORDON, supra note 13, at 3-7 (1972).
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subjects were Black because there were too few White subjects to study and
because, at the time, commentators had complained that a dearth of
research had been devoted to studying crime among Black youths.'" For
The Philadelphia Perinatal Project comprised nearly 10,000 pregnant patients who
delivered their children at Pennsylvania Hospital between 1959 and 1965; the children were
later tested at Children's Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. Id. at 11. All pregnant
women who attended Pennsylvania Hospital during this time were included in the Philadelphia
Perinatal Project if they wanted to be, except for those women who had unregistered
emergency deliveries or who were planning to deliver elsewhere. Id. at 498. The total sample
in the Philadelphia Perinatal Project reflects, in part, the characteristics of families who would
be interested in receiving inexpensive maternity care provided by a public clinic. The sample
was comprised predominantly (87%) of Black families, id. at 10, whose socioeconomic levels
were slightly lower than those of the United States population at the time. DENNO, BIOLOGY
AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 30. In 1978, the Sellin Center for Studies in Criminology
and Criminal Law at the University of Pennsylvania received a grant from the National
Institute of Justice to examine the Philadelphia Perinatal Project children. As part of the
grant, public school and police record data were collected on all 10,000 youths. For ten years
thereafter, detailed data were organized and analyzed on a subsample consisting of 987
individuals who constituted the subjects for the Biosocial Study. Id. at 29. These subjects
were selected from the first four years (1959-62) or from "cohorts" of 2,958 Black mothers
who participated in the Philadelphia Perinatal Project. A "cohort" is "[a]ny group that passes
through a set of experiences or institutions at the same time." JOHN M. NEALE & ROBERT
M. LiEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS OF RESEARCH 309
(3d ed. 1986).
Subjects were selected according to the following criteria: (1) attended a Philadelphia
public school, (2) stayed in Philadelphia from ages 10 through 17, (3) received selected
intelligence tests within six months of age seven and achievement tests at ages 13 and 14, and
(4) did not have a sibling in the sample to prevent the possible biases that could result in
examining family members. Comparisons between the final sample of 987 subjects and the
excluded sample of 1971 Black subjects showed no significant differences in key variables:
total family income, per capita family income, the number of prenatal examinations the
mother had, the mother's age, and the distribution of males and females. In general, the final
sample appeared to be representative of the sample from which it was drawn. DENNO,
BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 30.
166. The Biosocial Study's research on Black youths was initiated in 1980 at a time when
Black commentators were criticizing the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
("Office") for spending most (80%) of its monies researching White youths. See William
Raspberry, Youth Crime Funds Go to the Whites, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 1, 1980, at A9.
Essentially, commentators accused the Office of using crime statistics on Black youths in order
to acquire money, which the Office would then spend on research or rehabilitation programs
for White youths. One result was that a growing number of White youths were being
removed from the criminal justice system through deinstitutionalization and diversion
programs, while a growing number of Black youths were populating the prisons. One
commentator claimed that the premise underlying such differential treatment was that serious
Black offenders could not be similarly treated through counselling or diversion. Id. Because
of these claims, many federal programs providing research funding on crime today urge grant
applicants "to assess carefully the feasibility of including the broadest possible representation
of minority groups" in their samples. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ET
AL., PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT: RESEARCH ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ALCOHOL AND
[Vol 22:001
HeinOnline  -- 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 28 1994-1995
1994] Testing Penry 29
the purposes of this Article, only the results for the sample of 487 males
are reported because their crimes were more serious than the crimes found
among females" and because relatively few females are sentenced to
death.'
A. The Testing of Different Theories of Crime
In order to test different theories of crime with this sample, the
Biosocial Study used, in addition to urban environment, 69 three primary
VIOLENCE 15 (June 1993). The racial and socioeconomic characteristics of this sample (Black
and lower-class) limits the extent to which the results of the Biosocial Study can be
generalized to other groups comprised of individuals of different races and socioeconomic
status, such as middle-class Whites. However, the demographic homogeneity of the Study's
sample provides built-in "controls" for those racial and socioeconomic factors that have been
strongly linked to crime and its determinants. See generally MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL.,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972) (describing an earlier Philadelphia study that
concluded that race and socioeconomic status were major predictors of delinquency).
Therefore, it can be assumed that the results of the Biosocial Study are not attributed to racial
and socioeconomic variations among individuals.
167. The Biosocial Study also conducted in depth analyses on females that are not
reported here because of this Article's focus on more serious criminal behavior. For example,
although 22% of the 987 youths experienced at least one offense prior to age 18, strong
gender differences appeared. Over twice as many males (31%) as females (14%) had any
offenses. Among those males and females who did have an offense, twice as many males
(25%) as females (12%) had at least one offense that involved violence or injury to at least
one other person. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 40-41. Moreover,
22% of the sample of male offenders was arrested as adults compared to only five percent of
the female offenders. Id. at 46.
168. Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 845,
847-48 (1990); Victor L. Streib, Executing Female Juveniles, 22 CONN. L. REV. 3 (1989);
Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates andDeath Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders, January 1, 1973 to October
15, 1994 (1994) (unpublished pamphlet on file with the author).
169. During the 1960s, at the time of the Perinatal Project, the majority of large
metropolitan areas, including Philadelphia, experienced significant social upheaval and shifts
in the distribution of non-White residential patterns. ROGER LANE, WILLIAM DORSET'S
PHILADELPHIA & OURS: ON THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE BLACK CITY IN AMERICA 366
(1991); Frederick B. Glantz and Nancy 1. Delaney, Changes in Nonwhite Residential Patterns
in Large Metropolitan Areas, 1960 and 1970, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 2-
13. In general throughout the decade, there was an increase in the concentration of Blacks
and all non-Whites in urban areas. Id. at 13. In Philadelphia, for example, the proportion
of Blacks rose from 23% in 1960 to 33% in 1970. PETER 0. MULLER Er AL., METROPOLI-
TAN PHILADELPHIA: A STUDY OF CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGES 14 (1976). With the
exception of New York City, Philadelphia was probably the most socially heterogeneous city
in the United States. Id. at 1. Despite such diversity, however, ethnic and racial groups had
a long tradition of residential segregation. Id. at 18-23. Even neighborhoods that appeared
ethnically mixed in tabulated statistics remained firmly segregated at the block level. Id. at
22-23.
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data sources: (1) detailed data on early biological and environmental
factors; 17° (2) public school records;" and (3) official police records
During the time when the Biosocial Study's subjects were young children, most Blacks
with low incomes were concentrated in Philadelphia's inner city areas, which were isolated
socially and culturally. CONRAD WEILER, PHILADELPHIA: NEIGHBORHOOD, AUTHORITY, AND
THE URBAN CRISIS 181-82 (1974); see John F. Bauman et al., Public Housing, Isolation, and
the Urban Underclass, 17 J. URB. HIST. 264, 265, 273-86 (1991) (studying low income Black
families living in a large Philadelphia public housing project). Plagued by overcrowded and
substandard housing, the social-cultural constraints and conditions of these neighborhoods
were recognized as "festers of crime." See Gaeton Fonzi, Hard-Core Families A Festering
Empire, 51 GREATER PHILA. MAG. 17, 18, 50-55 (1960); see also JOHN F. BAUMAN, PUBLIC
HOUSING, RACE, AND RENEWAL: URBAN PLANNING IN PHILADELPHIA, 1920-1974, at 183-
201 (1987) (detailing how failed federal policies made public housing warehouses for the
urban poor).
Although the Biosocial Study "controlled" or accounted for the effects of the urban
environment because all subjects were raised in it, the Biosocial Study examined many other
kinds of socioeconomic and environmental data. These data included, among other factors:
parents' occupation, education, and employment history; family income and size; religion;
marital stability; welfare status; whether or not the child resided in a foster home; and number
of persons supported in the household. As would be expected, many of these factors were
interrelated. See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 19-24 (describing how
these variables were measured and interrelated and describing their association with crime).
170. The amount of data available for early biological and environmental factors was
extraordinarily comprehensive. Upon registration for the Perinatal Project, each mother
underwent a battery of interviews and physical examinations that provided data for each
pregnancy, including the mother's reproductive history, recent and past medical history, and
labor and delivery events. Data recorded for each child included information on neurological
examinations conducted at birth, throughout the hospital stay, at four months, and at ages one
and seven. Additionally, the children took speech, language, and hearing examinations at ages
three and eight. Researchers collected socioeconomic and family data during the mother's
registration and the child's seven-year examination. Data were collected immediately after
an event occurred. Highly structured forms and manuals were used to ensure comprehensive-
ness and comparability among the coders who recorded the data. All coders were either
medical doctors or psychologists trained to record data systematically. For descriptions of the
numerous procedures used to ensure reliability in the Project's coding, see NISWANDER &
GORDON, supra note 13, at 17-19, 500-24.
171. Philadelphia public school records also contained a variety of additional data about
each subject, although the Biosocial Study relied predominately on two types: (1) academic
achievement during ages 13 and 14 and (2) evidence of learning or disciplinary problems in
school.
The California Achievement Test measured academic achievement in grades seven and
eight, corresponding to ages 13 and 14. Social scientists have described the California
Achievement Test as an excellent data source for measuring both verbal and mathematical
achievement. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 171-73. Researchers have
found a high correlation between that test and the other tests measuring achievement that were
administered in the Perinatal Project at age seven. Id. at 169. Moreover, the standardization
sample for the California Achievement Test allowed for "proportionate representation in the
national norms of minority group students in the total school population." Id. at 171 (citation
omitted). However, social scientists have found evidence of test bias in a number of other
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for juveniles and adults.11 The Biosocial Study used three different
measures of juvenile and adult crime: (1) number of offenses; (2)
categorization of juvenile offenders according to levels of the most serious
offense recorded (violence, property, and nonindex); and (3) seriousness
of offenses.'
The first stage of the Biosocial Project examined nearly 150 factors
that were selected according to developmental and biopsychological theories
of crime which were grouped very generally into six types: (1) early
psychological tests administered in the Perinatal Project based upon a wide range of possible
racial, socioeconomic, and cultural influences. Id. at 173. Because the individuals in the
Biosocial Study were racially and socioeconomically homogenous, many of the factors most
influential in creating testing bias could not exist in the Biosocial Study's analyses. The
Appendix contains further discussion of the California Achievement Test and test bias.
Learning and disciplinary problems during school were measured, respectively, by the
presence of any record of the child's involvement in special school programs for those
classified as being mentally retarded or having disciplinary problems. Children with
disciplinary problems were diagnosed as having normal intelligence, but having some record
of asocial behavior in school, including a history of starting fires, physical aggression toward
teachers, maladjustment to school, and conduct disturbance. The Philadelphia School Board
stated that any school's recommendation of a child to a special school program was made
independently of any knowledge of that child's official delinquency status. DENNO, BIOLOGY
AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 32.
172. The Biosocial Study collected official police records for all subjects from ages seven
to 22. Id. at 32.
173. Violent offenders were those individuals who had a record of at least one violent
offense at any time during their juvenile criminal career. Violent offenses consisted of
murder, assault with intent to kill, aggravated assault, simple assault, rape, robbery with
injury, and any other offense that involved injury to the victim. Property offenders had a
record of at least one property-related offense, but no history of violent offenses. Property-
related offenses included vandalism, burglary, robbery without injury, and auto theft.
Nonindex offenders had a record of at least one nonindex offense, but no history of violent
or property-related offenses. Nonindex offenses included truancy, disorderly conduct, running
away, fraud, and possession of alcohol, marijuana, or hard drugs. rd. at 39.
The method of ranking and scoring offense seriousness was based on a widely accepted
and validated system of assigning numerical weights to different components of an offense that
was derived from a national survey of crime severity. See generally MARVIN E. WOLFGANG
ET AL., THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (1985) (describing the National Survey
of Crime Severity, overall findings, analytical results and suggestions for use). The different
components of an offense included the seriousness of personal injury to the victim, the amount
of property theft or damage, the extent to which the victim was intimidated (for example,
through a threat of gross bodily harm), the number of premises that the offender entered, and
the number of vehicles stolen. Id. at 129-36.
174. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 34-36. Developmental and
biopsychological theories of crime emphasize the physiological and psychological capacities
for individuals to adjust to their environments and to learn appropriate behavior. Individuals
who show central nervous system disorders, delayed maturation, or low intelligence test
scores, for example, may be more vulnerable to negative or stressful environments. Id. at 37.
These relationships exist regardless of the racial or socioeconomic characteristics of those
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central nervous system development (for example, prenatal and pregnancy
complications and Apgar score, an accepted and validated scale of health
and development immediately following birth); (2) intelligence and cerebral
dominance (for example, measures of verbal and spatial ability, as well as
indicators of laterality, such as the child's hand, eye, and foot preference,
which are indicative of learning disabilities); (3) physical growth and
development (for example, measures of height and weight); (4) neurologi-
cal status (for example, "soft neurological signs" or lack of coordination);
(5) attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity (for example, evidence of
disciplinary problems in childhood and adolescence, as well as mixed
indicators of laterality and difficulty with left-right identification); and (6)
general physical health (for example, high blood pressure, pica, lead
poisoning, and anemia).,
Although the Biosocial Study "controlled" or accounted for the effects
of the urban environment because all subjects were raised in it, the
Biosocial Study examined many other kinds of socioeconomic and
environmental data. These data included, among other factors: parents'
occupation, education, and employment history; family income and size;
religion; marital stability; welfare status; whether or not the child resided
in a foster home; and number of persons supported in the household. As
would be expected, many of these factors were interrelated. 76
The integration of both biological and environmental factors is a
crucial step toward understanding why crime occurs and how it relates to
criminal responsibility. Based upon extensive research in this area, a
juvenile or adult criminal status may depend, in part, on early developmen-
tal, biological, and environmental factors whose cumulative influences vary
over time. Associations among the biological and environmental factors
selected for the Biosocial Study were examined from the time of the
subjects' birth to young adulthood (age twenty-two) to determine which
factors predicted crime and how these factors were interrelated. A major
focus concerned offender group differences in measures of mental
retardation and intelligence.
individuals, although individuals who are minorities and are from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds are more likely to be raised in stressful environments. Id. at 19.
175. Id. at 37-39.
176. For a description of how these variables were measured and interrelated, as well
as extensive literature describing their association with crime, see id. at 19-24.
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B. Mental Retardation, Intelligence, and Crime"
1. Intelligence Test Scores.-Despite the magnitude of the research
conducted on the association between intelligence and crime, the nature and
extent of the link is not entirely clear. Most studies have not incorporated
sufficient numbers of intelligence measures at varying points in time to
draw definite conclusions. Nor have most studies examined intelligence
with other predictors of crime, such as -early central nervous system
development, socioeconomic status, or family factors."78
This section examines the relationship between crime and the
intelligence and achievement test scores of the Biosocial Study children at
ages four, seven, and thirteen-fourteen. These ages are important both for
intellectual and moral development and because of their relationship to the
onset of delinquency. '" The Appendix provides a description of the
different intelligence and achievement tests that were applied.
Offender group differences in test scores were examined using the
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the Duncan's Multiple Range test.
ANOVA tests whether significant differences exist in general among
offender groups. The Duncan's Multiple Range test contrasts all possible
pairs of group means to determine if there are significant differences
between each of the offender groups. For example, the Duncan test can
show whether the mean scores for nonoffenders are significantly different
from the mean scores of one-time offenders or multiple offenders. 8 '
In Table 1, the results of between-group differences examined with the
Duncan test are indicated by changes in the letters A and B (shown in the
column labelled [DN]), with order group means respectively from largest
to smallest. Means with the same letter are not significantly different at the
p < .05 level.' If two groups have identical letters (for example, [A]
177. Much of the discussion in this section derives from id. at 48-69.
178. The dearth of reliable research on this link is attributable in part to the argument
that intelligence is not a significant predictor of delinquency when controlling for important
intervening factors, such as socioeconomic status. However, there have been a number of
studies showing that the link between intelligence and crime remains strong even when
socioeconomic status is-controlled. Id. at 7-28. Conflicting conclusions about the
intelligence-crime relationship are further clouded by claims that intelligence test scores,
which have been largely standardized with White, middle-class children, do not adequately
reflect the abilities of minorities or those from lower socioeconomic levels. Such claims are
not entirely relevant, however, in studies of children who are of the same race and
socioeconomic background. Id. at 48.
179. Id. at 49.
180. Id. at 50.
181. Statistical significance refers to the probability that a particular result occurred by
chance. All factors were at least significant at the .05 level, the standard significance level
for social science research. Therefore, five times out of 100, a factor that appeared to be
1994]
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and [A]) or share the same letter (for example, [A] and [AB]), they are not
significantly different; if two groups have discrepant letters (for example,
[A] and [B]), they are significantly different.
a. Violent Offenders.-Table 1 shows that some test scores for
types of male offenders differed according to degrees of offense severi-
ty-particularly violence. At ages four and seven, violent offenders scored
significantly lower than some other offender groups or nonoffenders on the
following tests: Stanford-Binet, WISC Full Scale IQ, Verbal IQ and
Performance IQ, WISC Digit Span, WISC Block Design, and WRAT
Spelling and Reading. However, comparisons between nonoffenders and
violent offenders show that the differences are not great (not more than
three IQ points).
Similarly, when "high, medium, and low" levels of the WISC Verbal
and Performance IQ's are compared, violent offenders are disproportion-
ately ranked in the lower third of the test scores (which range from fifty-
seven to eighty-six), but not significantly so. Relative to nonoffenders,
violent offenders were also not significantly represented among those
youths with borderline-or-below (IQ < eighty) or mentally defective
(IQ < sixty-nine) intelligence scores for either the WISC Verbal or the
Performance IQ.
More striking differences existed at adolescence, however, and most
strongly for violent offenders. Compared to nonoffenders, violent
offenders scored seventeen percentiles lower on Vocabulary, sixteen
percentiles lower on Total Reading, and between ten and fourteen
percentiles lower on Total Language, the Total Battery, Comprehension,
Mechanics, and Usage and Structure. No differences existed for the Total
Math and its subtests, indicating that violent offenders performed more
poorly in verbal and language abilities.
The extent of these differences among offender groups becomes
magnified, particularly in adolescence, when sample test scores are
grouped into categories of high, medium, and low. Highly significant
differences existed in comparisons of select reading and language
achievement tests. For example, twice as many violent offenders than
nonoffenders scored in the bottom third (ranging from one to fifteen
percentiles) of the Biosocial Study sample for Total Reading achievement;
in turn, four times more nonoffenders than violent offenders scored in the
top third (ranging from thirty-eight to ninety-nine percentiles) of the sample
(x 2[2] = 16.5; p < .001). Comparable and highly significant disparities
significant would really not be; the apparent significance would only be by chance. JOHN
MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAwI 79 (3d ed. 1994); NEALE &
LIEBERT, supra note 165, at 62-63.
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existed between nonoffenders and violent offenders for Total Language
achievement (&[2] = 11.0; p < .01).
b. Repeat Offenders.-Table 2 shows comparisons among types
of male, repeat offenders. Chronic offenders (those who commit five or
more offenses) differed significantly from nonoffenders on the following
tests: Stanford-Binet, WISC Full Scale IQ and Verbal IQ, WISC
Vocabulary, WISC Digit Span, and WRAT Reading and Arithmetic.
Relative to nonoffenders, chronic offenders were also significantly
more likely to be in the bottom third of the WISC Verbal IQ (&[2] = 6.0;
p = .05). Although not significantly different from nonoffenders on the
WISC Performance IQ when separated into high, medium, and low
categories, chronic offenders were significantly represented among youths
with borderline-or-below and mentally defective scores on the WISC
Performance IQ. For example, more than twice as many chronic offenders
than nonoffenders had borderline-or-below Performance IQ 211 = 4.4;
p<.05), and over five times as many were scored as mentally defective
( 211 = 7.3; p < .01).
Again, discrepancies were strongest in adolescence. Chronic offenders
scored seventeen percentiles lower on the Mechanics subtest; fifteen to
sixteen percentiles lower on Total Reading, Total Language, and Compre-
hension; and ten to fourteen percentiles lower on Spelling and Total Battery
achievement and the Vocabulary and Concepts and Problems. In general,
for most tests, nonoffenders and one-time offenders scored higher than
nonchronic repeat offenders, who in turn scored higher than chronic
offenders.
Altogether, chronic offenders were significantly more likely to be in
the bottom third of the group in Total Reading (e[2] = 10.4; p < .01) and
Total Language ()e[2] = 11.0; p < .01). Only one of the twenty-five
chronic offenders scored in the top third of the Total Language and Total
Reading. Nonoffenders were much more likely to score in the top third.
2. Mental Retardation and Behavioral Disorders.-In light of the
considerably lower test scores found for repeat offenders, it would be
expected that delinquents would be disproportionately enrolled in school
programs for those children diagnosed as mentally retarded. Likewise, itwould be expected that children with some record of troublesome behavior
would be more likely than nondelinquent children to demonstrate disciplin-
ary problems in school.
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At the time achievement test scores were administered to the subjects
in the Biosocial Study (1972-1975), the School District of Philadelphia had
available Individual Education Programs that were recommended by a Child
Study Evaluation Team for all "exceptional students," particularly those
with learning and behavioral difficulties. Exceptional students were broadly
defined as "those who differ from the average to such a degree that they
cannot benefit from their educational experience without special education
program assistance." ' 2 A Child Study Evaluation Team consisted of a
varied group of school district personnel including the principal, school
nurse, school psychologist, counselor, other therapists and professionals, and
the student's parents. Together, the team- identified and evaluated
exceptional students according to specific criteria established by state
guidelines. Evaluations included a student's history, observations, review
of school achievement and adjustment, as well as psychological and medical
examinations.' s3
The Biosocial Study focused on programs for subjects diagnosed as
mentally retarded or in need of behavioral discipline. The determination of
mental retardation was based on a range of criteria, including results of a
full battery of psychological tests that included the Stanford-Binet, the
WISC-R, the Bender-Gestalt, the Goodenough-Harris drawing test, and the
Rorschach. Children were referred to disciplinary programs based upon
continuous psychological and behavioral assessments. These children were
diagnosed as having normal intellectual ability but a long record of asocial
behavior in school that included physical aggression toward teachers,
firestarting, inability to adjust in school, persistent alienation resulting in
conduct disturbance, and indifference toward misconduct.8 4
Altogether, five percent of the subjects were placed in programs for the
mentally retarded and five percent also were placed in programs for youths
with disciplinary problems.' As Tables 1 and 2 show, there were no
significant differences in the number of program placements for the
mentally retarded for either violent or repeat offenders. Highly significant
differences appeared, however, in the number of placements for disciplinary
programs. Violent offenders had over eight times more placements than
nonoffenders, and property offenders had over ten times more placements
than nonoffenders. Repeat offenders had over fifteen times the placements
of nonoffenders.
In light of test score differences in intellectual ability and program
placements among offender groups, results have shown overall that both
182. DENNo, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 62 (citation omitted).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 62-63.
185. Id. at 63.
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violent, nonchronic, repeat, and chronic offenders have a significantly
higher incidence of intellectual and learning difficulties, particularly in
verbal ability, and a higher incidence of disciplinary problems, in compari-
son to nonviolent offenders and nonoffenders. These differences in abilities
among the different types of offenders were strongest at adolescence. '86
The greatest differences were in program placements for youths with
disciplinary problems. Yet, the lack of statistically significant differences
for program placements for the mentally retarded does not support the
Texas court's "same" or "similar" evidence restriction on Penry claims
because there appears to be no link between either violent or nonviolent
crime and mental retardation.
In their review of delinquency studies, Loeber and Dishion'" cited
a child's conduct problems and poor academic performance as two of the
four principal predictors of delinquency among males. However, the great
majority of the research they examined did not study these two factors in
comparison with many other potential predictors. As yet, the relative
impact of conduct problems and achievement on delinquency is not known.
The next section analyzes key early developmental factors to determine
whether differences exist among offenders grouped according to the total
number of their police contacts as juveniles and as adults.
C. A Test of Multidisciplinary Effects on Crime
In this section, offender group differences in biological and environ-
mental factors are examined in three different ways following a statistical
screening of 150 variables in order to obtain statistically significant'
predictors of violent and chronic delinquent behavior."9 First, Table 3
186. For nearly all offender groups, fewer differences in test scores existed at ages four
or seven. This contrast between smaller test score differences at early ages and the
considerable differences found at adolescence may be attributable to one or more of the
following factors: (1) Tests at early ages may be cruder measures of intellectual or
achievement abilities than tests given during adolescence. It is likely that developmental or
situational events that occur after age seven influence achievement test scores at adolescence;
(2) schooling and school experiences can have a strong impact on intellectual development
during adolescence, a time when psychological, sociological, and biological changes enhance
individual variation and malleability; (3) low achievement test scores may be associated with
behavioral problems that occur during adolescence and impede learning ability. For example,
in the Biosocial Study, different categories of offenders were not disproportionately enrolled
in programs for the mentally retarded. It appears, then, that the problems faced by offenders
in school may be behavioral as well as intellectual. Id. at 64.
187. Rolf Loeber & Thomas 3. Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency: A
Review, 94 PsYcH. BuLLEIN 68, 68-99 (1983).
188. For a definition of statistical significance, see supra note 181.
189. Variable screening was conducted with three types of regression equations, using two
1994]
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analyzes mean group differences in a total of twenty-nine selected variables:
eight "dependent" variables, designated by the letter "Y," which were
predicted or explained, and twenty-two "independent" variables, designated
by the letter "X," that predicted or explained the dependent variables.'
Second, Table 4 reports the results of structural equation path models which
measure the direct and indirect effects of the twenty-two independent
variables on the eight dependent variables."' Third, Table 5 examines
the structural equation models in their "reduced form," which combines the
total impact of indirect and direct effects. Tables 3-5 focus on three
variables indicating behavioral problems at different ages: (1) disciplinary
problems in school, (2) juvenile crime, and (3) adult crime.
1. Mean Differences Among Adult Offender Groups.-Table 3 shows
offender group differences in test scores for males for the twenty-nine
dependent variables: number of offenses and seriousness of offenses. Those variables found
to be significant predictors at the p < .05 level with either of the two dependent variables are
listed. Included are six variables that were not significant predictors in the regression
screening but were included in analyses for theoretical reasons and because they were
significant predictors in past delinquency research. These variables were: Stanford-Binet,
WISC Verbal and Performance IQ, pregnancy and delivery complications, and family income
at birth and at age seven. One variable, "otoscopic exam" (hearing), was eventually not
included in the analyses. Although it demonstrated a highly significant effect on delinquency,
the statistical association was unreliably inflated because only two serious delinquents had an
abnormal hearing exam. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 70.
190. Id. at 71. A dependent variable "is that quantity or aspect of nature whose change
or different states the researcher wants to understand or explain or predict. In cause-and-effect
investigations, the effect variable is the dependent variable.' MONAHAN & WALKER, supra
note 181, at 38 (emphasis added). The Biosocial Study was unusual because it had more than
one dependent variable. An independent variable "is a variable whose effect upon the
dependent variable you are trying to understand:' Id. (emphasis added).
191. Structural equation path models, which combine features of factor analysis and
regression analysis, have been found to be useful in many areas of the social and behavioral
sciences. See Karl G. JRreskog, A General Method for Estimating A Linear Structural
Equation System, in STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 85 (Arthur S.
Goldberger & Otis D. Duncan eds., 1973); ADVANCES IN FACTOR ANALYSIS AND STRUCTURAL
EQUATION MODELS (KARL G. JORESKOG & D2rG SORBOM eds., 1979). The models are
appropriate for analyzing longitudinal panel data because each equation represents a "causal
link," in contrast to other techniques such as ordinary least squares regression in which each
equation represents an empirical association. Arthur S. Goldberger, Structural Equation
Models in the Social Sciences, 40 ECONOMERICA 979,979-1001 (1972); Arthur S. Goldberger,
Structural Equation Models: An Overview, in STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 2 (Arthur S. Goldberg & Otis D. Duncan eds., 1973). Karl Jdreskog's
development of a general linear model for the analysis of covariance structures, which was
applied in analyzing the Biosocial Study data, 'provides for a system of equations relating
observable and unobservable independent and dependent variables with an underlying causal
structure. Thus, a strong relationship between any particular variable and crime accounted for,
or "controlled," any other effects that may be influencing that one variable.
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variables across three different ages (four, seven, and thirteen-fourteen).
According to Table 3, there are striking differences between adult male
repeat offenders (those with two or more offenses) and the seriousness of
offenses and number of offenses these same subjects incurred as juveniles.
Repeat adults had four times the mean level of seriousness as one-time
adult offenders and more than eight times the mean level of seriousness as
those who never became adult offenders. In turn, repeat offenders had over
3.5 times more offenses as juveniles than one-time adult offenders and
nearly 6.5 times more offenses than those who never became adult
offenders. These differences are highly statistically significant, and strongly
support prior research demonstrating.the firm links between juvenile and
adult crime. Furthermore, repeat offenders evidence four times the
proportion of disciplinary problems accumulated over childhood school
years (up to ages thirteen-fourteen) than either one-time offenders or
nonoffenders.
An examination of tests of intellectual ability and achievement
demonstrate less consistency with past research. For example, there were
no significant differences among offender groups in test scores on the
Stanford-Binet at age four or on the WISC Verbal or Performance IQ tests
at age seven. Moreover, no offender group differences existed in a
physician's test of iniellectual status or speech at age seven. However, both
repeat and one-time offenders scored significantly lower than nonoffenders
on language achievement at ages thirteen-fourteen, and significantly more
repeat offenders than one-time offenders were enrolled in a program for
school children assessed as mentally retarded or learning disabled. These
results suggest that offender groups show no differences on tests, or in a
physician's assessment, of intelligence at a preschool or near-school age,
but that they do have difficulties in learning once they are enrolled in
school.
Explanations for these differences appear to be attributable to selected
early family effects, particularly for repeat offenders. The mothers of repeat
and one-time offenders have a significantly lower educational level,
although the difference is only by one year. However, the fathers of repeat
offenders have significantly longer periods of unemployment, and the
family experiences a higher number of household moves between birth and
age seven. In turn, repeat offenders show significantly higher levels of lead
poisoning at age seven relative to either one-time offenders or nonoffenders.
Likewise, one-time offenders have a lower incidence of left-hand preference
at age four, thereby supporting the proposition that certain types of
offenders have a lower, rather than a higher, incident of left-handedness.
No other significant differences were found among the groups on the other
variables.
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These results are important for what they do not show, in addition to
the significant differences that they do show. No significant mean
differences existed among offender groups relative to "traditionally"
important influences, such as family income and family size (number of
persons supported); nor do other variables, such as hand preference, appear
to be a distinguishing factor. On the other hand, repeat offenders do
demonstrate a significantly higher incidence of mental retardation, thereby
appearing to affirm Penry's assumption of a link between mental retardation
and crime.
It must be emphasized, however, that any impact these factors may
have on adult crime is contingent on both their simultaneous influences and
their. direct and indirect effects on juvenile and adult crime. If, for
example, mean differences in achievement test scores are primarily
attributable to the influences of disciplinary problems, then in a regression
model where all variables "control" or account for one another, the
significance of test score differences may disappear. These simultaneous
effects are examined in the next section.
2. Effects on Number of Adult Offenses.- Simultaneous direct and
indirect effects were measured two ways: (1) by structural equation models
in Table 4; and (2) by structural equation models in their "reduced form"
in Table 5.
In Tables 4 and 5, coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as
ordinary least squares regression. The effects of independent variables upon
dependent variables are represented by "X;" the effects of dependent
variables upon other dependent variables are represented by "Y."
In Table 4, five factors showed significant effects on the number of
adult offenses for males. The strongest factors were the number ofjuvenile
offenses, mothers educational level, and the seriousness of juvenile
offenses. These were followed by the father's educational level and the
subjects' language achievement. Yet the predictors for number of adult
offenses changed somewhat for the reduced form equations in Table 5,
which showed four influential factors: mother's and fathers educational
levels, lead poisoning, the amount of time the father was unemployed, and
the number of household moves.
Indeed, the results of Tables 4 and 5 are striking with respect to the
effect of lead poisoning. When considering both tables, lead poisoning is
the only factor that is a major predictor of all three behavioral problem
variables. As would be expected, the number and seriousness of juvenile
offenses are among the strongest predictors of the subjects' crimes as adults.
However, lead poisoning followed only the subjects' parents' educational
levels as the next strongest predictor.
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Although in Table 4, juvenile crime was most strongly predicted by the
number of the subjects' disciplinary problems in school and amount of time
the father was unemployed, evidence of lead poisoning was the third
strongest predictor. It was followed by low language achievement, number
of household moves, and evidence of abnormal speech. In turn, in the
reduced form equations in Table 5, juvenile crime was predicted by the
amount of time the father was unemployed, lead poisoning, and number of
household moves.
Notably, lead poisoning was the strongest predictor of the subjects'
disciplinary problems in school, followed next by evidence of anemia, a
frequent symptom of lead poisoning. 2 Also significantly related to
disciplinary problems were number of household moves, left hand
preference, and lack of foster parents. Moreover, as would be expected,
both WISC Verbal IQ and WISC Performance IQ had the only significant
direct effects on language achievement.
Although these results were consistent with past findings emphasizing
the significance of behavior and ability in predicting crime, 93 the
Biosocial Study also revealed the importance of a number of factors that
had never before been examined in crime research, particularly those related
to the urban environment. Indeed, the Biosocial Study is the first empirical
work demonstrating a relationship between crime and lead poisoning,'94
the only factor that showed an independent effect on each of the three
"problem behavior" variables. As the next section of this Article discusses,
although lead poisoning is often "biological-looking" because it can lead to
permanent physical disorders such as neurodevelopmental delay and
intellectual deficit, its origins are environmental. 5
In the Biosocial Study, crime also appeared to be related to a lack of
behavioral control typically associated with poor environment as well as
neurological and central nervous system disorders. Studies have shown
links among behavioral disorders, low school achievement, and subsequent
crime in intellectually normal children with attention deficit disorder and
hyperactivity.19 6  Comparable links have also been found with lead
192. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
193. See Jennifer L. White et al., How Early Can We Tell? Predictors of Childhood
Conduct Disorder and Adolescent Delinquency, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 507 (1990).
194. The Biosocial Study's finding of a relationship between lead poisoning and crime
was first reported in 1988. See Denno, supra note I1. A subsequent article reported a
significant relationship between lead and violence although the article failed to: (1) include
nonoffender control groups; (2) control for race; or (3) control for numerous other factors that
also could be related to both lead and crime. See R.O. Pihl & F. Ervin, Lead and Cadmium
Levels in Violent Criminals, 66 PsYCH. REPORTs 839, 839-44 (1990).
195. See infra notes 208-38 and accompanying text.
196. DENNo, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENcE, supra note 11, at 27.
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poisoning. 97
The Biosocial Study reveals that attention deficit disorder and
hyperactivity may be linked to learning and behavioral disorders that could
lead to academic problems among school children. Academic failure in
turn can perpetuate criminal behavior and hinder a child's attempts at
future, socially acceptable behavior even through adulthood.' 8
However, results of the Biosocial Study were not consistent with some
past findings showing associations among crime and low early intelligence,
mental retardation, or early central nervous system dysfunction (indicated
by the number of a mother's pregnancy complications).'99 The lack of
any strong association among these variables and crime may be due to a
number of factors, most likely the strong cultural and demographic
homogeneity of the sample and the simultaneous examination of both
biological and environmental variables. Traditional studies of crime have
typically examined either biological or environmental variables, but not both
together. The Biosocial Study shows, then, that even in a racially and
environmentally homogenous sample of individuals, environmental factors
predominate in predicting who will be a criminal and who will not.
These results suggest, then, that the Texas court's insistence on "same"
or "similar" Penry evidence in its evaluation of Penry claims has no
empirical support when mental retardation is examined in the context of
other kinds of interdisciplinary factors. The Biosocial Study's findings are
particularly compelling because the demographic characteristics of its
sample are consistent with those of death row inmates.' t' Furthermore,
other types of mitigating evidence that the Texas court has rejected, such
as mental illness or brain damage, were not included in the Biosocial
Study's analyses, suggesting that the findings discussed in this Article may
not account for other explanations of crime for which no measures were
available.
The next section discusses more fully the significance of the Biosocial
Study's finding of an association between lead poisoning and crime as a
background for describing how lead poisoning is currently being used as
mitigating evidence in Lewis v. Collins,20° an ongoing capital case in
Texas. Given that the Biosocial Study found mental retardation to be an
insignificant predictor of crime, this Article considers how other kinds of
factors, such as lead poisoning, may be applied in the context of a Penry
197. See infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
198. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 63-64.
199. Id. at 7-15.
200. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
201. No. 3: 93-CV-0329-G (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 17, 1993); see infra notes 259-80 and
accompanying text.
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claim, the former Texas death penalty statute at issue in Lewis, as well as
the amended Texas statute.
IV. Links Between Lead Poisoning and Typical Crime Correlates °
A few criminal law cases have relied on lead poisoning as a defense
or mitigating circumstance.2 3 Such use reflects attorneys' growing
awareness of the link between lead poisoning and a host of medical and
behavioral problems.2 In contrast, tort law has a well-established body
of precedent recognizing lead poisoning as the crucial factor in winning
generous damages awards. 205 A typical tort case involves a child or
202. This section incorporates portions of a prior article written by the author entitled,
Considering Lead Poisoning as a Criminal Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 377 (1993).
203. See, e.g., People v. Belcher, 74 Cal. Rptr. 602, 603 (Cal. CL App. 1969) (affirming
a conviction despite the defendant's claim that he was mentally ill during a burglary because
he suffered brain damage due to lead poisoning); Lewis v. Collins, No. 3: 93-CV-0329-G
(N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 17, 1993) (petitioning for federal habeas relief in an attempt to obtain
an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's mitigating factors, including evidence of lead
poisoning, which were never addressed by the trial court or in the state habeas proceeding);
Robert Enstad, Girlfriend's Killer Get 50-Year Term, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1991, § 2 at 3
(reporting that defense attorney contended that defendant's violent behavior was due to early
physical and sexual abuse, lead poisoning, and ingestion of drugs and alcohol).
204. See generally NAT1ONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING LEAD ExPosuRE IN
INFANTS, CHILDREN, AND OTHER SENSITIVE POPULATIONS (1993) (studying the effect of lead
exposure on sensitive populations, such as infants, children, and pregnant women); RICHARD
M. STAPLETON, LEAD IS A SILENT HAZARD (1994) (discussing the sources, consequences, and
treatment of lead poisoning); see also infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
205. See Mealey's Litigation Reports: Lead (1994-95). There are three main types of
tort law lead cases. Id. at 4. The first type involves a suit brought against a lead smelter or
lead facility, often by nearby residents. See, e.g., David Ruben, What Went Wrong in Throop,
Pa.?, PARENTING 70 (Oct. 1990) (describing the effects on neighborhood residents of the
dangerous levels of lead emitted from the former Mariol Battery and Equipment Company, an
automobile battery-processing and lead-reclamation plant). The second type involves a suit
brought against a manufacturer of lead paint, typically by individuals living in an apartment
or housing complex. The third type involves a suit brought against the landlord or owner of
a dwelling, usually by a tenant or tenants. See, e.g., Hurt v. Philadelphia -Housing Authority,
151 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (certifying a class of plaintiffs who were alleging.that the
Philadelphia Housing Authority failed to remove lead-based paint in housing that it owned or
operated). The third type often occurs when individuals are unable to sue the manufacturer
or industry. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993)
(affirming the trial court's dismissal of a suit filed against lead paint manufacturers); Hurt v.
Philadelphia Housing Authority, 806 F. Supp. 515, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that
manufacturers and sellers of lead-based paint cannot be held liable for breach of warranties on
the final use of their product because lead pigments "are merely component parts of lead-based
paint" and plaintiffs could not show the "requisite causal link between the harmful product and
its seller").
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teenager who was exposed to lead paint during infancy or at a very young
age, and who has since suffered various impairments, such as neurological
damage, attention deficit disorder, hyperactivity, mental retardation, learning
disabilities, or emotional disturbances. °  All such impairments have been
found to be associated with criminal behavior.2°7
A. The Sources and Consequences of Lead Poisoning
Children acquire lead toxicity in various ways.2 °8 The key source is
lead-based paint, which has been outlawed in new buildings, but remains
in older homes.20 9 Children ingest the paint by eating paint chips210 or,
perhaps more seriously, by swallowing the dust derived from the lead paint
that settles on walls, windows, and floors.' Other sources of lead
206. Richard Lewis and Barbara Pratt (attorneys at Cohen, Milstein, Hausfield & Toll)
compiled an extensive chart detailing various lead paint settlements and verdicts, with a focus
on the extent of damages rendered (based on expert opinion) and the result. See Richard
Lewis & Barbara Pratt, Lead Paint Settlement and Verdicts (on file at Cohen, Milstein,
Hausfeld & Toll, Washington, D.C.). The Lewis-Pratt chart indicates that in some cases
damages run into the millions of dollars for the various impairments suffered. See, e.g., Lugo
v. City of New York, No. 16511/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (detailing how the city has asked
the court to set aside a jury verdict of ten million dollars to a boy (then age 12) who was
diagnosed as lead poisoned in 1984 and who now evidences mental retardation and takes
special education classes); Walkerv. Thompson, No. 86-233045/CL-54616 (Baltimore City Ct.
Md. 1992) (awarding default judgment of eight million dollars to one child exposed to lead
at age one and a half who now evidences emotional disturbance, attention deficit disorder,
hyperactivity, and loss in IQJ; Miller v. Beaugrand, 564 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)
(affirming 1.7 million dollar award to one child (then age eight) exposed to lead in infancy and
who now evidences neurological impairment, attention deficit disorder, hyperactivity, and
impaired employability).
207. See infra notes 177-98 and accompanying text.
208. For a general overview, see STAPLETON, supra note 204, at 34-183.
209. Yona Arnitai et al., Hazards of 'Deleading' Homes of Children with Lead Poisoning,
141 AM. J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN 758, 758 (1987); Death From Lead Exposure Prompts
Calls for Yearly Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at B6. Although over two decades have
passed since Congress announced that lead-based paint was a health hazard that should be
removed from federally subsidized housing, researchers estimate that 900,000 units of public
housing still contain the paint. Moreover, approximately 57 million homes still have the paint,
although Congress banned its use over a decade ago. Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Opens a Drive to
Wipe Out Lead Poisoning Among Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1990, at Al.
210. See Committee on Environmental Hazards, Committee on Accident and Poison
Prevention, Statement on Childhood Lead Poisoning, 79 PEDIATRICS 457,459 (1987) (reporting
that according to most pediatricians, "virtually all" cases of serious lead poisoning are due to
the consumption of lead paint chips); but see Joel Schwartz & Ronnie Levin, Lead: Example
of the Job Ahead, 18 EPA . 42, 43 (1992) (stating that "most cases of lead paint poisoning
seem to occur from the ingestion of common household dust that has been contaminated with
lead," and that it is uncommon for children to be poisoned by eating paint chips).
211. See Committee on Environmental Hazards, supra note 230, at 457; Schwartz &
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toxicity are drinking water, soil, food, gasoline, and industry.212
Those factors enhancing an individual's susceptibility to lead toxicity
include young age and hand-to-mouth behavior, or nutritional deficiencies
of iron, calcium, or zinc.213 Iron deficiency, whether or not it is accom-
panied by anemia, "appears to be the single most important predisposing
factor for increased absorption of lead."214
Lead-exposure can produce devastating physiological and neurobehav-
ioral disorders among young children, who are far more sensitive to its
effects than adults.2 5 For example, numerous medical studies have
reported that both high and low lead levels have been linked to learning
disabilities, delayed nervous system development, deficits in visual motor
function, hyperactivity, hypoactivity, and abnormal social and aggressive
behavior.21 6  Associations between lead and intellectual deficits in
Levin, supra note 210, at 43; Hilts, supra note 209, at Al; N.R. Kleinfield, Lead Threat
Exposes and Engulfs a School, N.Y. TIMES,"Sept. 29, 1992, at Al, B6.
212. Committee on Environmental Hazards, supra note 210, at 457; Jane Perkins,
Recognizing andAttacking EnvironmentalRacism, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 389,394 (August,
1992); Schwartz & Levin, supra note 210, at 43-44; Hilts, supra note 209, at B20.
213. Committee on Environmental Hazards, supra note 210, at 460.
214. Id.
215. See UNrrED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, 230-R-92-008, at 19 (June 1992)
[hereinafter USEPA].
216. See, e.g., Peter A. Baghurst et al., Environmental Exposure to Lead and Children's
Intelligence at the Age of Seven Years, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1279, 1279-84 (1992) (noting
that there is an inverse relationship between I.Q. at the age of seven years and blood-lead
concentrations); Harris Chaiklin et. al., Recurrence of Lead Poisoning in Children, 19 SOc.
WORK 196, 196-209 (1974) (stating that the incidence of permanent brain damage is almost
100% in survivors of acute lead encephalopathy who are reexposed to lead-containing
environments); Committee on Environmental Hazards, supra note 210, at 457 (stating that a
reduction in intelligence and an alteration in behavior occur in children with elevated blood-
lead levels); Philip J. Landrigan & John W. Graef, Pediatric Lead Poisoning in 1987: The
Silent Epidemic Continues, 79 PEDIATRICS 582,583-84 (1987) (discussing studies that conclude
that elevated lead levels in children are associated with lower I.Q. and increased reading
abilities); Anthony J. McMichael et al., Port Pine Cohort Study: Environmental Exposure to
Lead and Children's Abilities at the Age of Four Years, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 468, 474
(1988) (stating thatblood-lead level concentration is inversely related to cognitive development
in children); Herbert L. Needleman et al., Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Performance
of Children With Elevated Dentine Lead Levels, 300 Nev ENG. J. MED. 689, 692-94 (1979)
(stating that children with high blood-lead levels performed worse on the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale, on attention-performance measurements, and on teacher behavioral ratings); Herbert L.
Needleman et al., Low-level Lead Exposure and the IQ of Children, 263 J.A.M.A. 673, 677-78
(1990) (stating that there is "a strong link between low-dose lead exposure and intellectual
deficits in children"); R.O. PihI & M. Parkes, Hair Element Content in Learning Disabled
Children, 198 ScIENcE 204, 204-06 (1977) (stating that lead toxicity has deleterious effects
on behavior, including hyperactivity); Robert Pear, U.S. Orders Testing of Poor Children for
Lead Poisoning, N.Y. TIMS, Sept. 13, 1992, at Al (stating that federal officials concluded that
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particular have also been found among samples of low-socioeconomic status
Black children.2 17
Recent research indicates that even relatively low lead levels can have
serious effects on the psychological and physiological development of
children, which may in turn demonstrate life-long consequences. 2 8 Thus,
in one study, teenagers exposed to lead in elementary school were seven
times more likely than those with very low lead levels to drop out of high
school, to have lower class standing, and more absenteeism. They were
also significantly more likely to evidence deficits in reading ability,
vocabulary, fine motor skills, reaction time, and hand-eye coordination.219
According to the authors of the study, lead exposure in children "may have
an important and enduring effect on the success in life of such children and
that early indicators of lead burden and behavioral deficit are strong
predictors of poor school outcome. '  A newly released study in
Australia concluded that both middle-class and poor children suffer losses
in intellectual ability after exposure to even low levels of lead and that such
intellectual deficits continued throughout elementary school.2'
B. The Effects of Race and Poverty
Although children of all socioeconomic classes are susceptible to the
effects of lead," urban-dwelling Black children appear to be most at
risk. Moreover, race appears to be a stronger risk factor than poverty.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency noted in a recent report
that although researchers were unable to link racial differences in death and
disease to environmental factors, the "notable exception" was childhood
lead poisoning?'P Across all socioeconomic groups, "a significantly
higher percentage of Black children compared to White children have
"levels of lead once thought to be safe can cause mental retardation, learning disabilities,
stunted growth, hearing loss, and behavior problems in children").
217. Stephen R. Schroeder et a., Separating the Effects of Lead and Social Factors on
IQ, 38 ENVrL. RES. 144, 149-52 (1985).
218. Herbert L. Needleman et a., The Long-term Effects of Exposure to Low Doses of
Lead in Childhood, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 83, 86 (1990); Mark Jaffe, Study: Lead Poisoning
Scars for Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1990, at Al, A4.
219. Needleman et a]., supra note 218, at 86.
220. Id. at 88.
221. Baghurst et al., supra note 216, at 1281-83.
222. Id. at 1282-83; Jane E. Brody, Study Documents Lead-Exposure Damage in Middle-
Class Children, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1992, at A20.
223. David Bellinger et a]., Longitudinal Analyses of Prenatal and Postnatal Lead
Exposure and Early Cognitive Development, 316 NmV ENG. J. MED. 1037, 1037 (1987).
224. USEPA, supra note 215, at 11.
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unacceptably high blood levels."
Poverty is an aggravating circumstance in the lead poisoning and race
link, however. According to the Environmental Defense Fund, over sixty-
seven percent of Black inner-city children have been contaminated by
excessively high levels of lead?26 Using a stricter measure of high level
toxicity based upon dentine lead (measured from teeth), one large study of
Philadelphia school children in 1971 showed that Black children from
public schools who resided in areas with poor housing had "marked
elevations" of dentine lead; in addition, twenty percent of the children had
lead levels in ranges associated with toxicity. 7
Lead in Philadelphia is still a problem, as one large scale study 28
and one recent case demonstrated in its detailed account of an urban Black
child who suffered brain damage as a result of a year of continuously eating
the sweet-tasting paint in his home. 9 Moreover, it has been estimated
that eighty percent of New York City's public schools still contain lead
paint.20 As the Committee on Environmental Hazards emphasized, the
incidence of lead poisoning among children is "particularly prevalent in
areas of urban poverty." 1 Thus, "[1ead exposure is at once a by-product
of poverty and a contributor to the cycle that perpetuates and deepens the
state of being poor. ' 2
There is, then, ample support for emphasizing the serious consequences
of lead poisoning, recently deemed the nation's leading environmental threat
to children. 3 In light of statistics indicating that one out of nine children
is adversely affected by lead, Dr. Louis Sullivan, former Secretary of Health
and Human Services, reached the following conclusion: "Lead poisoning
225. Id.
226. Perkins, supra note 212, at 394.
227. Herbert L. Needleman et al., Subclinical Lead Exposure in Philadelphia Schoolchil-
dren, 290 Nv ENG. J. MED. 245, 245 (1974); see also Landrigan & Graef, supra note 216,
at 582 (noting that between 1976 and 1980, the prevalence of increased lead absorption among
Black preschool children was 24.5%).
228. See Needleman et al., supra note 227, at 246 (reporting that children residing in the
"lead bel' of urban Philadelphia evidenced nearly five times greater concentration of lead than
their suburban counterparts).
229. Susan FitzGerald, Poisoned: A Mother Presses Without Success to Wrest Her Son
Free of Lead Paint, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 19, 1986, at Al.
230. Kleinfield, supra note 211, at Al, B6.
231. Committee on Environmental Hazards, supra note 210, at 457.
232. Perkins, supra note 212, at 394 (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
PREVENTING LEDn PoISONING IN YOUNG CHILDREN 12 (1991)); Pear, supra note 216, at Al
(reporting that low income children are at the highest risk for lead poisoning).
233. Steven Waldman, Lead and Your Kids, NEwsWEEK, July 15, 1991, at 42, 43; see
also Hilts, supra note 209, at Al (reporting on the federal government's broad effort to
eliminate lead poisoning in children).
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is entirely preventable, yet it is the most common and socially devastating
environmental disease of young children."' 4 Given the relatively stronger
effects of lead poisoning on blacks, its prevalence and consequences have
become a focal point in litigation concerning "environmental racism."235
Environmental racism characterizes the frequent and predictable environ-
mental circumstances of many urban minority poor who reside in run-down
housing that contains lead- or mercury-based paint, or who live near
hazardous waste sites.' 6
Whether or not "racism" accounts for the disproportionate exposure of
minority groups to lead poisoning and hazardous wastes is an issue open to
debate 7 Yet, minority groups provide an important focus for study in
234. Waldman, supra note 233, at 44.
235. The term "environmental racism" was first used in 1987 by Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis,
Jr., then Executive Director of the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice,
in order to characterize the results of the Commission's nationwide study on race and waste
distribution. See UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SociO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICs OF COMMUNITIES wmi HAZARDOUs WASTE SITES ix
(1987) [hereinafter Toxic WASTES AND RACE]; see also Paul Mohal & Bunyan Bryant, Race,
Poverty, and the Environment, 18 EPA J. 6, 7 (1992) (focusing on how environmental hazards
are disproportionately placed in minority communities); Dorcetta Taylor, The Environmental
Justice Movement, 18 EPA J. 23, 23-25 (1992) (reporting on minority activism for
environmental justice); UNrED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE,
PROCEEDINGS: THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENViRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP
SUMMrr (Charles Lee ed., 1991) (documenting the summit held October 24-27, 1991, in
Washington D.C.). The Commission's study reported a "consistent national pattern" showing
race "to be the most significant among variables tested in association with the location of
commercial hazardous waste facilities.' Toxic WASTES AND RACE, supra, at xiii; see also
Alice M. Brown, "Environmental Racism": Fact or Fiction?, 12 ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (FalllWinter
1992-93) (discussing the United Church of Christ study). Race was more significant than even
socioeconomic status in determining the location of these facilities. See TOXIC WASTES AND
RACE, supra, at xiii; see also Mohai & Bryant, supra, at 7 (positing that housing discrimina-
tion and lack of minority political resources suggest that race had an impact on the distribution
of environmental hazards independent of income). In determining that it was "virtually
impossible" that such a result would occur by chance, the Commission concluded that racial
biases influenced the location of waste facilities. Toxic WASTES AND RACE, supra, at 23.
236. See Anthony R. Chase, Assessing andAddressing Problems Posed by Environmental
Racism, 45 RTrrGERs L. REv. 335, 336-44 (1993); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key
to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q.
619, 620-34 (1992); Perkins, supra note 212, at389 (1992); Peter Reich, Greening the Ghetto:
A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REV. 271, 272-87 (1992); Walter
Willard, Environmental Racism: The Merging of Civil Rights and Environmental Activism,
19 S.U.L. REV. 77, 77-90 (1992); Robert Suro, Pollution-Weary Minorities Try Civil Rights
Tack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at Al, B7.
237. See Barbara R. Armwine & Thomas J. Henderson, Environmental Justice: A
Challenge to the Environmental and Civil Rights Community, 12 ENVTL. L. 4,4-5 (FallVinter
1992-93); Matthew Rees, The Birth of 'Eco-racism': Black and Green, NEv REPUBLIC, Mar.
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the context of examining a nexus between crime and its correlates because
they represent a grossly disproportionate percentage of those defendants
who are considered eligible for the death penalty, and who are ultimately
sentenced to death.
C. Lead Poisoning and the Nexus Requirement
The association between lead poisoning and the three "problem
behavior" variables in the Biosocial Study prompts consideration of the
significance of this result in light of other features of the urban environ-
ment. Although the Biosocial Study's subjects were born between 1959-
1962, they were examined during the course of twenty-four years: until,
respectively, 1983-1986. It cannot be assumed that environmental
conditions for minorities improved during that quarter century3 9
Moreover, in Philadelphia and other large cities, different kinds of
problems have developed. For example, homelessness, 24 drug abuse,24
2, 1992, at 15-16; Dick Russell, Environmental Racism, 11 AMicus J. 22,22-32 (1989); David
Sive, An Environmentalist's View of 'Environmental Racism', 12 ENVTL. L. 5,5-6 (1992-93);
Nathalie Walker & Michael Traynor, The Environmental Justice Movement: Two Cases in
Point, 12 ENVTL. L. 3, 3-4 (Fall/Winter 1992-93); Michael Weisskopf, Minorities' Pollution
Risk is Debated; Some Activists Link Exposure to Racism, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1992, at A25.
For this reason, alternative terms, such as "environmental justice" or "equity," have been
introduced because they are considered to be more politically neutral. Richard J. Lazarus,
Pursuing "Environmental Justice:" The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection,
87 Nw. U.L. REv. 787, 790 (1993).
238. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL, EQUAL JusTicE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
(1990)(discussing how arbitrariness and racial discrimination in capital sentencing persists even
in the post-Furman period); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment
in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27 (1988)
(claiming that race is an important factor in capital punishment); Samuel R. Gross & Robert
Mauro, Patterns of Death. An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and
Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984) (describing disparities in capital
punishment based on race).
239. See William J. Wilson, The Ghetto Underclass and the Social Transformation of the
Inner City, THE BLACK SCHOLAR at 10-11 (May/June 1988) (reporting that although population
in the nation's five largest cities decreased nine percent between 1970 and 1980, the poverty
population increased by 21%); see generally WILLIAM J. STULL & JANICE F. MADDEN, POST-
INDUSTRIAL PHILADELPHIA: STRUcrJRAL CHANGES IN THE METROPOLITAN ECONOMY (1990)
(concluding that the unemployment rate differential between the city of Philadelphia and its
suburbs was worse at the end of the 1980s than at the beginning of the decade).
240. See generally Elaine R. Fox & Lisa Roth, Homeless Children: Philadelphia as a
Case Study, 506 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL & Soc. ScI. 141 (1989) (discussing the tremendous
increase in homeless children).
241. See, e.g., Michael deCourcy Hinds, Pennsylvania City Hopes It's Bouncing Back
From the Bottom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, at A14 (quoting a Chester, Pa., resident who
stated that the example of success for children in that city is standing on the comer pushing
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and the social isolation of the ghetto242 have increased substantially since
the 1960s. There is also evidence to suggest that environmental hazards
such as lead toxicity may not have declined appreciably, if at all, given
accounts of its ongoing presence among urban minorities in Philadelphia
and elsewhere 43
A brief survey of the causes and consequences of lead poisoning, as
well as the results of the Biosocial Study, suggest that lead poisoning is
pervasive, particularly among Blacks in urban communities; that its effects
can be debilitating; and that it has been linked to disciplinary problems,
aggression, and as the Biosocial Study showed, repetitive and often violent
crime. A question that may be asked, then, is whether lead poisoning could
be viable for mitigating responsibility even under the Texas statute's nexus
requirement.
The answer may depend on how such evidence is presented. In People
v. Belcher,2" for example, the California appellate court affirmed the trial
court's conviction of Belcher for burglary and possession of narcotics2 45
based on evidence that Belcher had burglarized a small medical center and
was later found with two small bottles of narcotics.2 46 Belcher contended
on appeal that he was not guilty by reason of insanity based on his
psychiatrist's opinion that Belcher suffered brain damage due to lead
encephalopathy, a disease caused by severe lead poisoning. The psychiatrist
concluded that Belcher was mentally ill when he committed the acts.247
Belcher's personal physician also testified that tests he conducted on
Belcher five weeks after the incident demonstrated that Belcher was
suffering from lead poisoning. Belcher further testified that while
working as a chemist, he was exposed to a variety of chemicals and that he
could not remember any of the events associated with the crime. 49
Indeed, the police officer who had encountered Belcher after the burglary
stated that Belcher appeared to be "under the influence of something." 5
His "eyes were pinpointed, his eyelids droopy," and his speech was
unusually slow. The trial court, however, accepted the opinions offered
drugs); Tom Morganthau, Children of the Underclass, NmVSVEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 16
(documenting the effect of crack cocaine in the inner city).
242. See Wilson, supra note 239, at 14-16.
243. See supra notes 228-232 and accompanying text.
244. 74 Cal. Rptr. 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
245. Id. at 605.
246. Id. at 603.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 604.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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by prosecution experts who stated that Belcher's exculpatory statements at
the time of the crime (namely, that he had seen juveniles running from the
area) negated his contention that he had a mental lapse. '  The court
concluded that simply because Belcher appeared to be "abnormal" following
the acts in question, he was not necessarily insane in the eyes of the
law.
Although Belcher's arguments were weak, comparable kinds of
mitigating evidence have been successful in some cases that, contrary to
Belcher, are pertinent to capital litigation. For example, in 1989, a Navajo
tribesman, Terrance Frank, won a temporary insanity defense in a federal
murder case in which Frank admitted that he shot to death two individuals
and seriously wounded two others in a dispute on an Arizona reserva-
tion. Frank contended that he had been brain damaged because of
uranium-related radiation near his home. His brain damage, together with
the effects of the alcohol that he had ingested the day of the murder, caused
his temporary insanity at the time of the shootings. This evidence lead the
jury to agree on a second-degree murder conviction, concluding that Frank's
brain damage and alcohol use precluded premeditation and a first-degree
murder conviction. As one expert in the Frank case commented, if
such toxins lead to brain damage, the victims could become human time
bombs who are considerably more sensitive to the effects of drugs and
alcohol. 6
Lewis v. Collins,' a federal habeas petition on behalf of a death
row inmate, provides the most recent and sophisticated use of lead
poisoning in the context of other factors contributing to the inmate's
disadvantaged background. Lewis was initially litigated by attorneys at the
Texas Resource Center, who gathered extensive evidence on lead
poisoning and other background factors. Now the case is being handled by
A. Richard Ellis of California, who was able to extend the time for Lewis's
petition ten hours before he was to be executed.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 605.
254. United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 363
(1992); Charlotte-Anne Lucas, "Toxin Defense" Successful, NAT'L LJ., May 1, 1989, at 9.
255. Lucas, supra note 254, at 9.
256. Id.
257. No. 3: 93-CV-0329-G (N.D. Tex. petition filed Feb. 17, 1993). Lewis is still
pending; it is anticipated that an evidentiary hearing will be held on Lewis's claims.
258. The Texas Resource Center has offices located in both Houston and Austin, Texas.
Lewis's attorneys, Sandra Babcock and Elizabeth Cohen, discovered a substantial amount of
mitigating evidence, including evidence of lead poisoning.
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D. Lewis v. Collins: A Case Study in the Nexus Requirement
In 1985, Andre Lewis shot to death a seventeen-year-old boy in a
Texas convenience store that he was robbing because the victim did not
respond fast enough to Lewis's command to lie on the floor. Lewis, who
was nineteen, already had a criminal record that included the use of hard
drugs and alcohol.' 9 Even though there is evidence that the robbery was
orchestrated by Lewis's uncle, the uncle was cleared of all charges because
he turned in Lewis.
Generally, Ellis is attempting to show that, in addition to other factors,
Lewis's exposure to high lead levels while he resided at the George Loving
Housing Project (GL-P) in West Dallas contributed to his neurological and
developmental deficits. This lead poisoning evidence constitutes a major
part of a substantial amount of other mitigating evidence that was never
presented to the jury at Lewis's trial nor at his state habeas proceeding.26'
Ellis is attempting to obtain an evidentiary hearing on this mitigating
evidence in federal district court for the Northern District of Texas.2 62
Ellis and the Texas Resource Center have presented Lewis's lead
poisoning evidence on a variety of different levels that parallel those used
in tort law cases.263 First, these attorneys reported the results of the
Biosocial Study described in this Article, thereby introducing statistical
evidence of a significant link between lead poisoning and criminal
behavior.2 Next, they presented evidence of the effects of lead in
Lewis's environment at the GLHP during key developmental ages:
Mr. Lewis lived in the George Loving Housing Project (GLHP) in
West Dallas from at least August, 1972 until at least May, 1974.
The section of GLHP Mr. Lewis lived in was located less than
one-half of a mile from the RSR Lead Smelter. This lead smelter
expelled lead into the air, on average, over twenty times the limit
suggested by the EPA. The area within a two mile radius of the
smelter was discovered to have high lead contamination. The areas
most affected by the pollution were those areas downwind (to the
north/northwest) of the RSR smelter. The section of GLHP
occupied by Mr. Lewis and his family when Mr. Lewis was
259. Robert Wilonsky, Who We're Killing, DALLAS OBsERvER, Feb. 11, 1993, at 15.
260. Id. at 20.
261. A limited amount of mitigating evidence was introduced before the Texas court. See
Lewis v. State, 815 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
262. Letter from A. Richard Ellis, Attorney at Law, to Professor Deborah W. Denno (Dec.
13, 1993) (on file with the author).
263. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
264. Affidavit of Deborah NV. Denno g 2, 8 (Feb. 4, 1993), Lewis v. Collins, No. 3: 93
CV-0329-G (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 17, 1993).
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between the ages of five and seven years of age was identified as
the most contaminated area.265
Based on the results of analyses of soil samples from the section of
GL-P where Lewis played, Lewis was exposed to twenty times the
unacceptable level of lead on a daily basis for at least two years2
Moreover, school records indicated that Lewis was exposed to unacceptable
lead levels for at least five more years thereafter. Even though his family
moved in 1974, they continued to reside in homes less than two miles
downwind from a smelter. Therefore, between the ages of five and twelve,
Lewis was exposed to very high lead levels. 6 Moreover, Lewis showed
evidence of the effects of severe lead poisoning.
Mr. Lewis exhibited many of the classic symptoms of chronic lead
poisoning as a child and young adult. Mr. Lewis's school records
indicate that he consistently flunked various elementary and junior
high school classes. Mr. Lewis's grandmother, Ms. Berry, reports
that Mr. Lewis "was slow in his studies and had trouble learning."
Ms. Sims, Mr. Lewis's aunt, states that she took care of Mr. Lewis
a great deal in his formative years. Ms. Sims recalls that Mr.
Lewis went to special schools and had trouble with other children
"making fun of him." Mr. Lewis's teachers and coaches describe
Mr. Lewis as being easily led, simple, and quiet. One coach, Mr.
King, states that Mr. Lewis is incapable of understanding complex
strategic moves or plans and would become confused when given
a simple set of instructions to follow. Mr. Lewis's crime is one
where it appears that Mr. Lewis shot a convenience store customer
as an impulsive reaction to that person's failure to "get down"
when ordered to do so. My research indicates that heightened
impulsivity is related to early exposure to high levels of lead.268
The results of Lewis's evaluation by Richard L. Peck, Ph.D., a
psychologist, also highlight the impact of lead exposure in the context of
other .mitigating factors in Lewis's family and environment.269 Attorneys
from the Texas Resource 'Center asked Peck to evaluate Lewis's current
mental state, as well as his 'mental state at the time he committed his
offense. Peck performed this evaluation based oni information he gathered
from a variety of sources: a three-hour clinical interview and mental status
examination of Lewis; Lewis's school records as well as those of his sister;
medical records noting wounds'sustained by Lewis and his parents; a social
265. Id. 3.
266. Id. 4.
267. Id. 5.
268. Id. '9-10.
269. .See Psychological Evaluation of Andre A. Lewis by Richard L. Peck, Ph.D. (Dec.
21, 1992), Lewis v. Collins, No. 3: 93-CV-0329-G (N.D. Tex. filed'Feb. 17, 1993).
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history of Lewis obtained from interviews with his family members; and the
results of recent studies examining the link between lead poisoning and
neurological and behavioral disorders.270
Among other things, Peck concluded that the symptoms of Lewis's
"cognitive and personality impairments are consistent with both the effects
of lead poisoning and neurological deficits due to trauma, both physical and
psychological."' Furthermore, his condition was indicative of "severe
childhood abuse," which had been reported both by Lewis and his
interviewed relatives.2 Lewis had "significant cognitive deficits, which
are indicated by his expressive language disorder and developmental writing
disorder."2 73 Furthermore, Lewis was found to be "unable to adequately
process disparate pieces of information such that his ability to respond to
new situations is significantly impaired. 274 Peck particularly emphasized
a number of parallels between lead contamination and risk factors for
criminal behavior. The disordered thinking, impaired impulse control,
reduced verbal skills, and demonstrated increase in school failure, all known
products of lead exposure, arguably increase the probability that some
individuals will be less equipped to respond appropriately to the challenges
of society. 275 Peck noted, however:
It is impossible to determine with absolute certainty, even with
additional medical evaluation, whether lead toxicity was the primary
factor in [Lewis's] learning disabilities and subsequent criminal
behavior. Nevertheless, based on the high levels of lead contamination
in the area in which he lived, and my observations of his cognitive
impairments, there is at least a strong possibility that the exposure to
lead in his environment had serious consequences in his early develop-
ment and significant ramifications in late adolescence.276
For these reasons, Peck concluded that Lewis's "cognitive deficits, his
intoxication on the night of the crime, and the facts of this particular crime,
create a substantial doubt that [Lewis's] reaction to the victim's failure to
cooperate during the crime or to 'get down' as commanded was a reasoned,
intentional attempt to kill."2'
Given the manner of presentation of mitigating evidence in Lewis's
case, it appears that Ellis has succeeded in establishing a nexus between
Lewis's disadvantaged background and his lack of culpability at the time
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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he committed the crime. Lewis's background and cognitive deficits, in
addition to his intoxicated condition at the time of the crime, contributed
to the kind of "damaged personality" required by the Texas court in
Richardson v. State,278 so that the defendant in that case could excuse his
criminal behavior.
Perhaps Richardson could have achieved a more favorable result had
he presented his mitigating evidence in a more causal framework. As the
Texas court stated, Richardson "made no showing that, from the viewpoint
of society as a whole, his alleged childhood experience of poverty, parental
neglect, illiteracy, and a speech disorder tends to excuse his capital
crime."279 Yet, abnormal speech (which included evidence of stuttering)
and low language achievement (which included evidence of illiteracy) were
significant predictors of juvenile delinquency in the Biosocial Study.
Indeed, speech problems were characteristic of many of the most serious
offenders.280 In turn, other types of indicators of parental neglect, as
measured by problems with the father's employment history, were
significant predictors of both juvenile and adult crime.
Presumably, this type of evidence could establish the Texas court's
nexus requirement under the former Texas statute, as well as the causation
standard that may be applied under the amended Texas statute. The
question is whether it should. The next section examines whether such a
requirement has any empirical or logical basis to it, given the criminal law's
propensity to favor factors that appear to be more "internally" based, and
our gaps in knowledge regarding the underlying causes of crime.
E. Interpreting Unexplained Behavior
The question of whether there is any basis for a nexus requirement in
general, or a lead poisoning defense in particular, is perhaps most
appropriately placed in the context of debates regarding free will, determin-
ism, and the ability of social scientists to predict the course of any one
individual's behavior. If social scientists wanted to establish "true" cause
and effect relationships between certain factors, such as lead poisoning and
crime, they would want to predict all-or one hundred percent-of an
.individual's future behavior. Such a total degree of prediction is not
possible, however, particularly when dealing with human behavior.28' In
278. 879 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
279. Id. at 884.
280. See Table 4 (noting that low language achievement was the fifth strongest predictor
of juvenile delinquency).
281. Establishing reliable levels of prediction is a problem in most scientific research.
See MONAHAN & LAURENS, supra note'181, at 79.
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the Biosocial Study, comprehensive models of biological and environmental
variables predicted twenty-five percent of future adult criminality, an
acceptable and statistically significant level of prediction. Three-quarters
of such behavior, however, was left unexplained. 2
There are two possible ways of interpreting such unexplained behavior.
First, those who believe in a philosophy of "full determinism" state that
theoretically it is possible to predict all of an individual's behavior, but
social scientists are currently aware of only a small number of behavioral-
causing factors.283 "Full determinists" would contend that a lead poison-
ing defense would be untenable because there may be comparably severe
deficiencies that individuals possess that are simply not yet kmown to social
scientists or others investigating the causes of crime. Moreover, it could be
argued that all criminal behavior could be excused or defended if we could
simply find the causal factors for it. As Moore notes, such an argument
results in the "absurd conclusion that no one is responsible for any-
thing,""8 4 and therefore no one can be punished.
A second view, perhaps represented by a philosophy of "degree
determinism," suggests that varying degrees of 'free will and determinism
exist in all actions depending on the impact of various biological and
environmental forces. Therefore, degree determinism may be defined as the
"degree of freedom of choice on a continuum from the hypothetically
entirely rational to the hypothetically pathologically determined-in states
of consciousness neither polar condition exists."285 With regard to the
issue of criminal defenses, "degree determinists" must consider when an
individual's behavior is so beyond that individual's control that he or she
is no longer blameworthy. In other words, at what point along this
continuum does responsibility end and excuse begin?
According to Norval Morris, external pressures, such as social
adversity, have a much more powerful impact on crime than internal
pressures, such as psychosis, 8 6 although the criminal law favors inter-
nally-based excuses.28 7 For example, .there is no recognized criminal
defense based upon socioeconomic deprivation.288 For this reason, Morris
282. See DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 89-92.
283. This viewpoint is a modification of that discussed by Michael Moore. See Michael
S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL L. REV. 1091, 1118-19 (1985).
284. Id. at 1092.
285. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 61 (1982).
286. Id. at 61-64. For example, some courts have considered postpartum psychosis as a
viable insanity defense. See Amy L. Nelson, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis:" A New
Defense?, 95 DIcK. L. REV. 625 (1991) (discussing the use of postpartum psychosis as a
defense to infanticide).
287. See MORRIS, supra note 285, at 64.
288. Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background:" Should the Criminal La, Recognize
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contends that the insanity defense should be abolished because such excuses
unjustifiably give "excessive weight to the psychological over the so-
cial. 289
Alternatively, Richard Delgado suggests that a defendant's acts should
be partially excused if it can be shown that the conditions that caused them
are attributable to society's neglectO Under this "societal fault model,"
society should be responsible for failing to eliminate particular crime-
causing factors that could have been prevented. 91 Similar to negligence
cases in some jurisdictions, the jury would be instructed to apportion the
degree of fault between society and the individual.2 The defense would
be limited to cases in which the defendant can prove that specific social
institutions, such as schools, failed to discharge a duty to the defendant
resulting in his or her commission of a criminal offense.293
In light of the Biosocial Study's link between lead poisoning and
crime, Delgado's argument seems compelling. Lead poisoning, largely an
environmental and societally-created problem, was a leading predictor of
both juvenile and adult crime, as well as disciplinary problems in
school. 94 Furthermore, although lead toxicity is preventable, efforts to
eliminate lead have had limited success.?
Regardless, Delgado's reasoning is not flawless. Given scientists'
limited abilities to predict behavior, it is as yet unknown what other factors
may be significant in causing crime. In line with the full determinists,
scientists simply may not know the "true" causes of crime because so much
of an individual's behavior is left unexplained?96 The danger is that the
criminal law may be providing a defense for those who are truly culpable
and who actually do have sufficient self-control over their behavior.
F The Myth of the Internal-External Distinction-
Given this position, why should the criminal law retain defenses for
those behaviors that appear to have an internal, rather than an external,
cause? Morris may be correct in stating that internal factors are preferred
as criminal law defenses, yet there is no evidence that they are any stronger
a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 1. 9, 9 (1985).
289. MoRRIs, supra note 285, at 64.
290. See generally Delgado, supra note 288 (addressing the issue of whether a
disadvantageous bickground should mitigate criminal responsibility).
291. Id. at 89.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See supra Tables 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 228-34.
296. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
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determinants of an individual's behavior. Alternatively, internal factors
may be more appealing because they appear to be more tangible, hence
more "causal." During the 1980s, for example, a number of courts
considered the results of Positron Emission Tomography (PE) scans in
their sentencing decisions, relying in part on the presumption that a
biological predisposition to brain damage could preclude free will.2 7 It
was not until 1992, however, that any court rendered admissible into trial
testimony concerning the results of PET scans to determine a defendant's
sanity.29 In People v. Weinstein,299 a New York court concluded that
an expert's in-court consideration of the results of a PET scan and skin
conductance response tests-indicating the existence of both an arachnoid
cyst and metabolic imbalances in the defendant's brain-was not unreason-
able in making a diagnosis of insanity. However, the court emphasized that
attorneys could not mention at trial "certain theories relating to human
behavior" because they were not generally accepted as valid. These
included statements that either arachnoid cysts or reduced levels of glucose
metabolism in the frontal lobes of the brain, directly cause violence.3°
Regardless, the State agreed to negotiate a plea rather than go to trial,
thereby reducing the initial charge from murder to manslaughter. 01
Irrespective of the court's constraints on the mentioning of causal theories,
the State's concern was that such tangible evidence could lead a jury could
to presume causation anyway.
Furthermore, it remains to be considered the extent to which some
environmental forces, such as lead poisoning, produce internal disorders,
such as neurodevelopmental delay or hyperactivity. A knowledgeable
defense attorney could legitimately transform what appears to be an
externally produced disorder, such as lead poisoning, into an internally
produced one, claiming that the defendant's behavior was due to the brain
damage or neurological dysfunction that the lead induced. This was the
strategy used in the Terrance Frank case,3" and perhaps for this reason
that strategy was influential. This is also the approach taken in Lewis v.
Collins.3 Consider, however, the disadvantages faced by those attorneys
who are not so knowledgeable about the consequences of externally
produced events.
297. Dorthy Nelkin,AfterDaubert: The Relevance and Reliability of Genetic Information,
15 CARDOZo L. REv. 2119, 2121 (1994).
298. Cerisse Anderson, Brain Scan Deemed Admissible at Trial; Guilty Plea Follows
Insanity Defense Ruling, N.Y.L.L, Oct. 20, 1992, at 1.
299. 591 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
300. Id. at 722-25.
301. Anderson, supra note 298, at 1.
302. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 257-77 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps, however, the issue is not "causal appeal" but the fact that
what appear to be internally produced stresses, such as brain cysts, occur
less frequently than those that are externally produced, such as lead
poisoning and other environmental toxins. Indeed, if the criminal justice
system were to allow a defense based upon "rotten social background,"
nearly every poor minority who has committed a crime would be found less
culpable because a wealth of social science research suggests that most
criminals are socioeconomically deprived.3 °'
This prompts another question: Is infrequency of occurrence or"exoticism" a proper rationale for allowing a criminal defense to be
acceptable? Perhaps exoticism is the basis for- some of the successful
defense strategies based on postpartum psychosis.3 °5 But if this is a
factor, then the lead poisoning defense may be appealing to juries because
it has a limited history in criminal trials.
Perhaps, however, -the apparent focus on exoticism is simply the
criminal law's way of allowing some recognition, and therefore allowance,
for human frailty without setting the majority of wrongdoers free. It may
be argued, however, that if mitigation or allowances are based on such
calculations and causal fictions, this practice could undermine the philoso-
phy and purpose of the criminal law. Perhaps it would simply be more
'just" to discard defenses based upon both internal and external factors,
recognizing that although both may cause crime, it is unfair to allow only
for those factors (internal) that occur less frequently albeit no more
forcefully than those factors (external) that may be responsible for
determining a large proportion of lawbreaking. In this sense, then, courts
applying the nexus requirement would need to broaden their view of the
types of evidence that they would consider to be significant with respect to
the defendant's culpability.
V. Conclusion
Based upon an examination of the Penry standard as well as the Texas
court's current and "future" nexus requirement in the context of the
Biosocial Study's results, this Article reaches several conclusions. First,
304. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNciL, I UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
VIOLENCE 131-39 (Albert J. Reiss & Jeffrey A. Roth eds. 1993) (emphasizing the link between
low socioeconomic status and crime); E. Britt Patterson, Poverty, Income Inequality, and
Community Crime Rates, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 755,755-64 (1991) (reviewing recent research on
poverty and crime); see also Nicholas Lemann, Four Generations in the Projects, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 13, 1991, (Magazine), at 17 (examining four generations of a family living in a Chicago
housing project).
305. See generally Nelson, supra note 286.
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there is no logical or empirical basis for the nexus requirement, given social
scientists' current inability to predict human behavior. Although social
scientists are able to show that some factors are stronger predictors of crime
than others, most criminal behavior cannot be predicted from their models.
Of the factors that do prove to be significant predictors of crime, there is
no evidence to suggest that those considered to be "internal" (namely,
biological or psychological) are more important than those considered to be
"extemal" (namely, environmental). Furthermore, there can be considerable
interlinkage between the two, as the research on lead poisoning has
demonstrated. Yet, the criminal law presumes that what appear to be
"internal" factors are more causally linked to crime. Thus, these factors are
more likely to be considered acceptable under the Texas court's mitigating
evidence standard, as the Texas court has demonstrated in its focus on
"same" or "similar" Penry evidence, most particularly mental retardation.
In light of this incongruity, this Article suggests that the criminal law
in general, and the Texas court in particular, be more flexible in considering
both internal and external factors in assessing the standard for presenting
mitigating evidence. However, this Article suggests that a number of
accepted mitigating factors or defenses that are popular simply because they
are exotic or have the appearance of causality should be discarded if there
is no evidence that they have any distinguishable relation to culpability and
criminal behavior. Not only would this approach to considering mitigating
evidence have the appearance of fairness, it would also in fact be more fair,
given its closer link to the reality of criminal behavior-what little we know
of it.
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APPENDIX
MEASURES OF INTELLIGENCE AND ACHIEVEMENT
Because the Collaborative Perinatal Project sample discussed in this
Article was tested between 1959-62, the measures used reflect the times,
though all remain valid and reliable indicators of intelligence and achieve-
ment today. The references and empirical research cited in this Appendix
are dated, however, in order to reflect how the measures were constructed
and viewed at the time they were administered.
A. Four-year Intelligence Test
1. Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale.-The Stanford-Binet Intelligence
Scale assesses the intellectual development of children between the ages of
thirty months, the upper age limit on the Bayley Scales of Mental and
Motor Development, and forty-eight months, the lower age limit on the
WISC, which was administered at seven years. According to Sattler,316
the Stanford-Binet measures primarily visual-motor capabilities, nonverbal
reasoning, social intelligence, and language functions between the ages 6f"
two and five years, and abstract reasoning and memory skills at older ages.
The third revision of the Stanford-Binet, which was used in the Collabora-
tive Perinatal Project, is based on a standardized sample with rescaled
intelligence scores normally distributed at a mean of 100 and a standard
deviation of sixteen.
The Collaborative Perinatal Project applied a short form of the
Stanford-Binet. Silverstein3 demonstrates that the short and long forms
have comp.rable reliability. The high internal reliability of the short form
has been shown on the national Collaborative Perinatal sample.3 " The
accepted validity of the Stanford-Binet as a measure of global intelligence
has been discussed in depth,3" although in general it appears to reflect
more strongly verbal relative to performance or spatial skills.3 0
306. Jerome M. Sattler, Analysis of Functions of the 1960 Stanford-Binet Intelligence
Scale, Form L-M, 21 J. CUNICAL PSYCHOL 177, 177-79 (1965).
307. A. B. Silverstein, The Internal Consistency of the Stanford-Binet, 73 AM. J. MENTAL
DmcIENcY 753, 753-54 (1969).
308. See SARAH J. BROMAN Er. AL, PRESCHOOL IQ: PRENATAL AND EARLY DEVELOP-
MENTAL CORRELAi 36-37 (1975).
309. See LEE J. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PYSYCHOLOGICAL TesTiNG 195-96 (1970);
David Freides, Review, in THE SEVENTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 772, 772-73
(Oscar Y. Buros ed., 1972) (reviewing the Stanford-Binet intelligence scale).
310. A.B. Silverstein, The Measurement of Intelligence, 4 INT'L REV. REs. & MENTAL
RETARDAiION 193, 193-227 (1970).
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B. Seven-year Intelligence Tests
1. Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC).-According to
Friedes,' the WISC is the best available test purported to measure
intelligence in children. In contrast to the Stanford-Binet, the WISC
examines both intellective and nonintellective factors rather than a
unidimensional construct. The WISC is comprised of twelve subtests
divided into two summary scales of verbal (Verbal IQ) and nonverbal
(Performance IQ) intelligence, and includes a total summary intelligence
scale (Full Scale IQ). The raw scores for each subtest are converted into
scaled scores with a mean of ten and a standard deviation of three. Verbal
IQ's, Performance IQ's, and Full Scale IQ's are summaries of the scaled
scores of the appropriate subtests and have distributions with a mean of 100
and a standard deviation of fifteen.
In the Collaborative Perinatal Project, a short form of the WISC was
administered comprised of four of the verbal subtests and three of the
performance subtests. Silverstein312 has shown that the long and short
forms are functionally equivalent. Briefly, the three summary scales and
twelve subtests measure the following:313
(1) Full Scale IQ-a general measure of intelligence based upon a
composite of all twelve subtests.
(2) Verbal IQ-a summary measure of verbal ability based upon a
composite of four subtests.
(a) Information-assesses how much general information a child has
obtained from the surrounding environment, requiring such skills
as remote memory, ability to comprehend, and associative
thinking, in addition to interests and reading background.
(b) Comprehension--determines the level of a child's use of practical
judgment in daily events in addition to the development of social
acculturation and a maturing conscience or moral sense. Posses-
311. David Freides, Review, in THE SEvENTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 801-
03 (Oscar K. Buros ed., 1970) (reviewing the WISC).
312. See A.B. Silverstein, Validity of IVISC Short Forms at Three Age Levels, 31 J.
CONSULTING PSYCHOL 635, 635-36 (1967).
313. See generally ALAN J. GLASSER & IRLA L. ZIMMERMAN, CLINICAL INTERPREIrATION
OF THE WECHSLER INTELUENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN 36-104 (1967) (describing in dewil
each of the various subtests).
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sion of practical information and the ability to use past experience
in socially acceptable ways are important.
(c) Vocabulary-most likely represents the best single measure of
intellectual ability by indicating a child's learning ability, extent
of information and ideas, quality of language, degree of abstract
thinking, and development of thought processes. This test is
influenced by a child's education and environment.
(d) Digit Span-deterrines the child's ability to attend in a simple
situation, measuring both immediate auditory recall or immediate
auditory memory (attention) span.
(3) Performance IQ-a summary measure of performance (nonverbal or
spatial) ability based upon a composite of three subtests.
(a) Picture arrangement-assesses-such abilities as perception, visual
comprehension, planning with sequential and causal events, and
synthesis into intelligible wholes.
(b) Block design-measures perception, analysis, synthesis, visual-
motor coordination, and reproduction of abstract designs, in
addition to logic and reasoning applied to space relationships.
Nonverbal concept formation along with implicit verbal manipula-
tion is also required.
(c) Coding-evaluates in particular visual-motor dexterity with pencil
manipulation, in addition to the ability, speed, and accuracy of
absorbing new material presented in an associative context.
The WISC was standardized on a sample of over two thousand White
males and females at different age levels who were representative of
geographic location, type of location (urban or rural), and parental
occupation in the 1940 census statistics. The Validity of the WISC as a
measure of mental ability is described by Matarazzo314 using multiple
kinds of evidence; it has received substantial corroboration by others.3? 5
In neuropsychological research, the WISC verbal and performance
summary scales and subtests, respectively, are used as one of a number of
possible indicators of left and right hemisphere functioning. Thus, a large
314. JosEPH D. MATARAZzo, NVELCHER's MEAsUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT
INTELLIGENcE 258 (5th ed. 1972).
315. See Freides, supra note 311, at 801-03.
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discrepancy between verbal and performance IQ scores (computed by
subtracting scores or taking an absolute value) is used as one of several
indicators or organic brain damage? 16  In the Biosocial Study, this
discrepancy is defined as the Difference between Performance and Verbal
WISC scores (PIQ - VIQ difference).
2. Wide Range Achievement Test.-The Wide Range Achievement
Test (WRAT) attempts to measure "achievement" rather than "intelligence,"
although the two concepts are not entirely clear 17 The WRAT is particu-
larly appropriate for the Biosocial Study because it assesses very elementary
reading, arithmetic, and spelling skills that can be more easily tested with
disadvantaged populations who may lack a more formal education.
The WRAT comprises three parts:
(1) Spelling-which consists of copying marks that resemble letters,
writing one's name, and dictated words;
(2) Reading-which involves recognizing and naming letters and pro-
nouncing words; and
(3) Arithmetic-which includes counting, reading number symbols, solving
oral problems, and figuring written computations.
According to Lezak,31s the WRAT, which was developed by
Jastak,319 is "carefully standardized with a full set of norms for each
subtest." Reading and spelling constitute a large verbal componerit;
arithmetic measures mostly motivation and arithmetic ability. Although
some have criticized the validity of the WRAT,3' the test is widely used
and correlates at fairly high levels with the WISC and Stanford-Binet
Mental Age; it correlates at a high level with the California Achievement
316. Hallgrim Klove, Validation Studies in Criminal Neuropsychology, in CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: CURRENT STATUS AND APPLICATIONS 211, 227-235 (Ralph M. Reitan
and Leslie A. Davison eds., 1974).
317. MATARAZZO, supra note 314, at 281-88.
318. MuRIEL D. LEzAK, NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL AssEssMENT 233 (1976).
319. See Joseph Jastak, Wide Range Achievement Test, in 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY AND PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC METHODS (Arthur Weider ed.,
1953) (describing the WRAT).
320. See Paul D. Courtney, Review, in THE THIRD MENTAL MEASURENIENTS YEARBOOK
46 (Oscar K. Buros ed., 1949) (reviewing the Wide Range Achievement Test); Verner M.
Sims, Review, in THE THIRD MENTAL MEAsuREMENTs YEARBOOK 47 (Oscar K. Buros ed.,
1949) (reviewing the WRAT).
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Test (CAT) 21
3. Bender Gestalt Test, Koppitz Scoring; Bender Gestalt, Time in
Seconds.-The Bender Gestalt is a nonverbal measure of perceptual activity
and motor response, along with a spatial component. Of all visuographic
tests, it is the most widely applied, in part because of the diversity of its
uses.3  The test can be used to evaluate intellectual capacity and fumc-
tioning as well as emotional stability.3z The Koppitz method of scoring
was developed to assess abilities among children.324
The Bender test is a set of nine geometrical designs comprising dots,
lines, angles, and curves, which children must reproduce. In the Koppitz
method of scoring, thirty errors are possible in reproduction; thus, the
higher the score (a maximum of thirty points), the poorer a child's
performance.
Norms for Koppitz scoring were established on a sample of 1,055
children from diverse backgrounds with ages ranging from five to ten years.
The Bender test discriminates among children with many different levels of
visual-motor functioning up to age eight years, beyond which time it
distinguishes only inferior from average performance. According to
Koppitz, very fast test performance is more often a sign of immaturity and
impulsiveness rather than ability; very slow performance is either a sign of
compulsiveness or visual-motor impairment?'
The Bender's ability to discriminate between neurological and
psychiatric patients as well as organically impaired and normal patients has
been demonstrated?' The test's effectiveness may be due in part to its
requirement of a "high level of integrative behavior that is not necessarily
specific to visuopractic functions but tends to break down with cortical
damage."'327 The Bender test has also been found to be an effective
measure of developmental changes among a sample of European chil-
dren,3" although it was not an accurate test of neurological impairment
321. Ernest D. Washington & James A. Teska, Correlations Between the Wide Range
Achievement Test, the California Achievement Tests, the Stanford-Binet, and the Illinois Test
of Psycholinguistic Abilities, 26 PSYCHOL. REP. 291, 291-94 (1970).
322. Lezak, supra note 318, at 310-11.
323. Fred Y. Billingslea, The Bender Gestault: A Review anda Perspective, 60 PsYcHOL.
BULL. 233, 233 (1963).
324. Elizabeth M. Koppitz, The Bender-Gestault Test for Children: A Normative Study,
16 J. CLuqCAL PsYcHoL. 434,434-35 (1960).
325. Id.
326. See Billingslea, supra note 323, at 233-51; Lezak, supra note 318, at 319-20.
327. Lezak, supra note 318, at 320.
328. Barbaa K. Keogh, The Bender Gestalt with Children: Research Implications, 3 J.
SPECIAL EDUC. 16, 16-22 (1969).
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among inner-city children? 9
4. Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test.-The Draw-A-Man Test,
originally published in 1926 by Goodenough, was extensively revised by
Harris in 1963. The Collaborative Perinatal Project used the revised form,
which is described in detail in Children's Drawings As Measure of
Intellectual Maturity.330
Since its original publication, the Draw-A-Man Test has "enjoyed
widespread popularity;" in 1961 it was among the ten most frequently used
tests in clinical psychology, even though it can be applied only to children.
The test requires only that a child "make a picture of a man," a task that is
easy to administer and quick to complete. Harris's revision of the test
redeveloped the Goodenough scoring criteria on a more "highly objective,
empirical basis"; implemented a new standardization of the test; converted
the IQ computation to the deviation IQ concept from the old mental
age/chronological age ratio; and introduced a companion Draw-A-Woman
Test.33
Similar to the original test, the revision is intended to assess intel-
lectual capacity (maturity) through the accuracy of a child's observation and
level of conceptual thinking, rather than artistic ability.332 Other research
also suggests that performance on the Draw-A-Man may be related to a
compulsivity-cautiousness cognitive style, possibly reflective of personality
differences. 333 The notion that personality may influence Goodenough-
Harris scores was discouraged by Harris and others.3 4 However, in a
review of studies focusing on delinquent children, Harris does suggest that"a Goodenough IQ markedly lower than that earned on the Binet may
afford some indication of emotional or nervous instability.' 335 Whether
or not the Draw-A-Man Test can be used as a projective technique remains
an open issue, however.
SPEcL.. EDUc. 16, 16-22 (1969).
329. Doris W. Welcher et al., The Bender-Gestalt Test as an Indicator of Neurological
Impairment in Young Inner-City Children, 38 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 899, 899-910
(1974).
330. DALE B. HARRIS, CHILDREN'S DRAWINGS AS MEASURES OF INTELLECTUAL
MATURrIY (1963).
331. James A. Dunn, Review, in THE SEV'ENTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 671-
72 (Oscar K. Buros ed., 1972) (reviewing the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test).
332. Anne Anastasi, Review, in THE SEVENTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 669-
71 (Oscar K. Buros ed., 1972) (reviewing the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test).
333. Hilda P. Lewis & Norman Livson, Personality Correlations of IQ Discrepancy:
Stanford-Binet and Goodenough-Harris, 131 J. GENErIC PSYCHOL 237, 237-42 (1977).
334. Marjorie P. Honzik, Drawings of Mind, 11 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. 28, 28-30 (1966)
(reviewing Harris, supra note 330).
335. HARRIS, supra note 330, at 28.
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new standardization sample in 1950 of nearly 3,000 children between the
ages of six and fifteen whose parents were representative of U.S. occupa-
tions as well as of four major geographic areas. In the new test, as in the
earlier version, scoring reliabilities are over .90; split-half reliabilities are
in the .70's and .80's, and retest reliabilities fall in the .60's and .70's. In
general, correlations between the Goodenough-Harris and the Stanford-
Binet, WISC, WAIS, and other tests are significant. Harris suggests that
the drawings reflect conceptual maturity only up to the stage when a child
ceases to use concrete concepts and relies more on higher order abstractions
and verbal means of expression.336
5. California Achievement Test.-The California Achievement Test
(CAT) is designed for the measurement, evaluation, and analysis of school
achievement. The emphasis is upon content and objectives in the basic
curricular areas of reading, mathematics, and language.337
The 1970 edition, which is used in the present study, was the latest of
a number of revisions that had been available to schools for over fifty
years. Nearly 300 state-approved reading,'langage, and mathematics texts,
as well as other recommended subjects of study, were referenced in revising
the 1970 edition. Selection of the standardization sample involved a two-
stage stratified random sampling from public schools with more than 300
students and from Catholic schools 3
The public school populatioh was stratified according to geographic
region, average enrollment per grade, and community type; and the
Catholic schools, according to enrollment, geographic region, and type
of school (diocesan or private). The sampling technique provided for
proportionate representation in the national norms of minority group
students in the total school population. The final standardization sample
contained 203,684 students from schools in 36 states.3 39
The CAT covers grades 1 through 12 with five overlapping levels of
tests at the second, fourth, sixth, and ninth grades. This overlap allows the
test to be administered according to a student's attainment level rather than
chronological age, if necessary. Overall, eleven test scores are available:
a total battery score; three tests (reading, math, and language); their six
respective subtests; and a total spelling score. Tests and corresponding
336. Anastasi, supra note 332, at 670.
337. ERNEsr W. TIEGs & WILLIS W. CLARK, EXAMINER'S MANUAL AND TEST
COORDINATOR'S HANDBOOK: CALIFoRNIA ACHIEVEMENT TEST (1970).
338. Miriam M. Bryan, Review, in THE EIGHTH MErAL MEASURiEMEs YEARBOOK 35
(Oscar K. Buros ed., 1978) (reviewing the California Achievement Test).
339. Id.
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subtests are as follows: 34°
(1) Total Reading-intended to measure reading progress, comprehension,
the interpretation of written material, and the criticism of its content.
(a) Vocabulary-in lower levels, assesses skills of auditory and visual
discrimination, structural analysis, and pre-reading abilities; in
upper levels, evaluates functional vocabulary and the ability to
adapt meaning to context.
(2) Total Math-intended to measure a student's level of achievement in
a general mathematics program.
(a) Computation-assesses a student's skill in the fundamental opera-
tions necessary in addition, substraction, multiplication, and
division of positive integers, fractions, and measurement quanti-
ties.
(b) Concepts and problems-tests a student's ability to perform
written single-step and multiple-step problems involving funda-
mental operations and the understanding of basic concepts.
(3) Total Language-intended to assess basic communication skills.
(a) Mechanics-determines a student's ability to recognize those
words that need capitalization and to use punctuation marks.
(b) Usage and structure-tests a student's ability to distinguish
between standard and nonstandard English usage, to recognize
possible sentence transformations, and to identify sentence
elements, their functions, and total sentence structure and type.
(4) Spelling-determines a student's ability to distinguish between correct-
ly spelled and misspelled words.
(5) Total Battery-reflects a student's standing in terms of total achieve-
ment level.
For the purposes of the Biosocial Study, Level Four CAT tests for
grades seven and eight were used for analyses. A student's percentile rank
340. Timis & CLARK, supra note 337, at 16-25.
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is defined as the percentage of the students in the national norm group who
had a lower score. Percentile ranks are recommended over other types of
scores available for the CAT for determining the current status of a
student's achievement. Their limitations in terms of unequal scale units
should be recognized, however 4
Generally, alternate form reliabilities for the total battery and the three
tests are high, ranging from .80 and .96; reliabilities for subtests are lower
but still adequate. Evidence of content validity is derived mostly from data
showing the appropriate placement of items in various levels and from
subtest intercorrelations. More important is the content validity achieved
from examining nationwide texts and course curricula.!4"
The language tests are open to more criticism than other items in the
CAT battery primarily because they appear to be overly difficult at each
grade levelff and omit certain tests of important skills, such as paragraph
organization.344 Overall, however, the language tests are considered to be"good state-of-the-art instruments."3 4 Indeed, the CAT in general is
highly praised in terms of its validity, comprehensive test and interpretive
materials, reliability, and standardization procedures.
341. Il at 47-50.
342. Frank B. Womer, Review, in TEE EiGmHH MErNAL MEAsuREMENTs YEARBOOK 37-
38 (Oscar K. Buros ed., 1978) (reviewing the California Achievement Test).
343. Bryan, supra note 338, at 36.
344. Alan C. Purves, Review, in THE EIGHTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 134-
35 (Oscar K. Buros ed., 1978) (reviewing the California Achievement Test).
345. Ellis B. Page, Review, in THE EiGHMI MENTAL MEA SREEmN YEARBOOK 134
(Oscar K. Buros ed., 1978) (reviewing the California Achievement Test).
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